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ABSTRACT 
Under President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) rolled out 
the controversial parent-child separation policy, also known as zero tolerance, and the 
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program in 2018–19. How DHS conducts strategic 
communications about such controversial policies is directly related to public and 
stakeholder perception of these policies. A newly developed stakeholder-centric 
measurement and evaluation model used to evaluate these two policy case studies 
demonstrates that Trump’s DHS used messaging which was, at times, inconsistent and 
even contradictory. While communications on MPP showed an evolution in DHS’s 
ability to successfully engage in strategic communications related to these enforcement 
efforts, the parent-child separation policy represents the prototypical example of 
information fratricide. The research methodology adopts an outsider viewpoint and 
employs a media content analysis of high-level public communications of DHS officials. 
Identification and future use of DHS’s top communications strengths, as displayed in 
these sample communications, can lead to more effective strategic communications and 
improved stakeholder engagement. The thesis concludes with generalized 
recommendations for future communications policy within DHS based on lessons 
learned from this thesis research. 
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Many Americans disapproved of the immigration enforcement policies of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) during the Trump administration. This thesis 
begins by asking what can be learned about DHS’s communications strategy during 
controversial policy rollouts and whether a negative perception of those policies can be 
improved. Previous research has not examined in depth the nature of DHS’s public-facing 
communications on these issues (rather than researching the policies themselves). This 
thesis targets the gap in understanding about DHS’s strategic communications efforts in 
contentious areas of immigration policy. 
As case studies, the thesis examines the parent-child separation policy from 2018 
and the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program from 2019. How DHS conducted 
strategic communications about these controversial policies is related to public and 
stakeholder perception of these policies. The research question focuses on how DHS 
conducts strategic communications about such controversial policies, and which 
measurement and evaluation (M&E) model can be used to gauge the effectiveness of 
communications output. To answer this question, the thesis reviews the literature on public 
communications theories and builds upon it to develop a working model of measuring the 
effectiveness of output of strategic communications. The research methodology adopts an 
outsider viewpoint and employs a qualitative media content analysis of high-level public 
communications of DHS officials. Source documents consist of published media articles, 
congressional reports, non-governmental organization (NGO) reports, official DHS press 
releases, and other official DHS communications. 
None of the existing evaluation models described in the literature were satisfactory 
for the analysis required in this thesis. They are fairly high level and do not offer enough 
specificity to analyze actual examples of communications output. Thus, the development 
of a new model serves several important purposes. First, it is useful for analyzing the 
particular communications at issue in the two case studies. Second, it may be of future use 
for practitioners or researchers seeking to evaluate a law enforcement agency’s 
communications output. Third, the development of a new model allows for the inclusion 
xvi 
of critical concepts from the literature, including Good and Bad Strategy, information 
fratricide, participatory and emergent strategy, timing of messaging, and the Dark Side of 
communications.1  
The model developed for this thesis is the Stakeholder-Centric Communications 
Output Evaluation Model for Government, depicted in Figure 1. It has a primary focus on 
stakeholders and publics as both informing the communications strategy and being the 
recipient of communications output. The model contains general sections pertaining to the 
strategy, messaging, and language of an organization’s desired or emergent 
communications output, which roughly correspond to an agency’s strategic, tactical, and 
operational communications decisions. 
 
Figure 1. Stakeholder-Centric Communications Output Evaluation Model 
for Government 
Evaluation of the two policy case studies using the model demonstrates that DHS 
used messaging which was at times inconsistent and contradictory. The parent-child 
separation policy represents the prototypical example of information fratricide, which 
occurs when one component or official of an agency releases public information or 
 
1 Richard Rumelt, “The Perils of Bad Strategy,” McKinsey Quarterly, June 1, 2011, 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-perils-of-
bad-strategy; Ronald E. Dulek and Kim Sydow Campbell, “On the Dark Side of Strategic 
Communication,” International Journal of Business Communication 52, no. 1 (January 2015): 123, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2329488414560107. 
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statements which undercut the messaging of another component or official.2 This policy 
went by several names: zero tolerance, parent-child separation, and family separation. It 
remains unclear what the precise motivations were for enacting the policy, and the thesis 
examines the various justifications. In addition to lack of clarity about motivations for the 
policy, messaging about fundamental aspects of the policy emanated simultaneously from 
multiple levels of authority. The mixed messaging regarding many facets of the policy 
caused public and stakeholder confusion and outrage, courtroom losses, and may have 
resulted in DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen’s ouster.  
By contrast, communications on MPP showed a progression in the ability of DHS 
to successfully engage in strategic communications related to this enforcement effort. 
These communications were more consistent, both vertically through time and horizontally 
across different speakers. The inconsistencies in messaging previously seen during the 
parent-child separation policy were noticeably absent in the MPP-related communications. 
Key officials issued consistent messaging and thereby did not engage in information 
fratricide, did not undermine each other’s efforts to achieve policy successes, and did not 
speak publicly with messaging that was different than the positions the agency had 
previously taken. 
After evaluating these two cases, several of DHS’s key strengths in strategic 
communications are determined to be: (1) creating strong, emotional messaging; (2) 
utilizing awareness of likely pending outrage (emotion) and litigation, developed from the 
agency’s prior experiences; and (3) capitalizing on diplomatic successes and partnerships 
with regional nation partners. While the use of strong messaging was arguably one of the 
administration’s communications strengths, it was used at an inappropriate time during the 
zero tolerance policy. In an appropriate situation, use of such messaging could be part of a 
powerful strategy to achieve favorable communications outcomes. As events actually 
unfolded in 2018, however, it is not clear why the use of strong messaging was needed. 
 
2 Getting Better at Strategic Communication, House, 112th Cong., 1st sess., July 12, 2011, 5–8, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT366.pdf; Christopher Paul, 
Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 6–
7. 
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Under Rumelt’s conception of Good and Bad Strategy, a mismatch between the use 
of key strengths and appropriate pivot points in the external environment is not a successful 
application of Good Strategy.3 With MPP, however, the opposite occurred. The messaging 
was more refined and less emotional, signaling an awareness that restraint was needed due 
to the possible negative public reaction about the rollout of the program and the potential 
of future litigation. The use of such restraint was well-timed during the policy rollout and 
allowed the program to expand to location after location and scale up operations. These 
two case studies represent progression in the ability of DHS to successfully engage in 
strategic communications on enforcement policy. 
Finally, the thesis considers generalized guidance for future communications policy 
within DHS, discussing such potential future policy action through the use of if-then policy 
statements. A summary of these recommendations is listed in Table 1 of this executive 
summary. 
In summary, this thesis targets a gap in understanding of appropriate methods to 
evaluate communications output. When controversial policies are involved, the 
communications supporting a policy rollout will never be perfect. With careful, thoughtful 
planning and appropriate evaluation along the way, an agency can discover and make 





3 Rumelt, “Perils of Bad Strategy.” 
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Table 1. Strategic Communications Policy Recommendations 
Policy Issues Recommendations 
Future unpopular policies: 
 
If DHS wants to roll out a potentially 
unpopular immigration policy in the future, 
then prudent actions in the area of strategic 
communications to ensure the success of 
communications objectives include: 
Identifying communications strengths in 
advance 
Devoting significant resources toward these 
strengths 
Considering information end-states 
Identifying appropriate policy justifications 
before messaging 
Replacing existing unpopular policies:  
 
If DHS wants to replace an already 
unpopular policy with a more palatable 
version, then appropriate communications 
methods include: 
Timely acknowledging and taking ownership of 
prior problems 
Varying the use of clarity or ambiguity in 
messaging to the agency’s advantage 
Reframing issues to distance a new policy from 
a problematic one 
Political appointee role:  
 
If a future administration or DHS 
leadership appoints so-called hardliner or 
politically charged figures to highly visible 
positions, then the role of such officials in 
the development or coordination of 
messaging can include: 
Coordinating among agency leadership who 
takes the lead on public communications 
Ensuring that public statements of lower-level, 
non-leadership officials are completely 
consistent with leadership-approved messaging 
Designating a lead agency or department for 
messaging decisions during multi-agency 
policy rollouts 
Using inter-agency clearance processes to vet 
release of controversial policy details or 
arguments 
Undisclosed policy pilots:  
 
If DHS conducts future pilots of 
controversial policies in an undisclosed 
manner, then prudent safeguards to 
minimize fallout if such policies are later 
made public include: 
Justifying non-disclosure with appropriate 
reasoning to withstand public or judicial 
scrutiny 
Expecting and preparing for eventual full 
disclosure 
Incorporating disclosure planning into 
information end-states 
Preparing for accusations that the agency has 
intentionally released inaccurate, conflicting, 
incomplete, or otherwise unsavory information 
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I. INTRODUCTION: TRUMP’S DHS DRAWS 
NEGATIVE ATTENTION1 
The immigration enforcement components of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)—Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP)—drew significant negative attention from the public, the media, and 
Congress during the Trump administration during 2017–2020.2 There are few issues in 
America as polarizing as immigration enforcement policy. Often, official statements from 
DHS during the administration, ostensibly aimed at convincing the public of the legitimacy 
of DHS’s actions, were conflicting and inconsistent regarding the rationale of policy 
choices.3 Such conflicted public communications from DHS arguably added to the 
polarization among the public. Relatedly, DHS was plagued by an inability to retain 
executive personnel in the positions of secretary of homeland security and top agency 
leadership during the Trump administration.4 Frequent turnover in these key positions 
 
1 The views, arguments, and interpretations expressed in this thesis are the personal opinions and 
views of the author, and do not represent the official positions of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or the ICE Office of the Principal 
Legal Advisor. 
2 Frank P. Harvey, The Homeland Security Dilemma: Fear, Failure and the Future of American 
Insecurity (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010). 
3 For example, this 2019 letter to the public explained the rationale behind recent enforcement actions 
after the fact: Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ERO Letter to the American Public” (Washington, 
DC: Immigration and Customs Enforcement, September 12, 2019), https://www.ice.gov/statements/
enforcement-and-removal-operations-mythbuster. 
4 Richard Kleinfeld, “The Politicization of Our Security Institutions,” Just Security, April 25, 2018, 
https://www.justsecurity.org/55383/politicization-security-institutions/; Rew Restuccia and Daniel 
Lippman, “Nielsen’s Allies Trying to Rehab Her Image for Life after Trump,” Politico, April 9, 2019, 
https://politi.co/2G1o5l5. 
2 
begged the question of who is running DHS this month.5 The leadership turnover was tied 
to problems with several major policy rollouts and subsequent failures.6 
Under the Trump administration, DHS engaged in several policy changes that drew 
negative attention, such as the 2018 parent-child separation policy and the 2019 rollout of 
the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), also known informally as the remain-in-Mexico 
program.7 The variety of reactions from the public, Congress, the courts, and the media 
about these policies are typical of the wide range of positive and negative sentiment 
generated by the Trump administration’s immigration enforcement policy. While much has 
already been written in the press and in academia about the merits of these policies, 
previous research has not examined in depth the nature of DHS’s public-facing 
communications on these issues. This thesis seeks to fill the gap in understanding of DHS’s 
strategic communications efforts in this contentious area of public policy. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT: THE UNCLEAR ROLE OF STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATIONS IN TRUMP’S IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Using the rollout of the parent-child separation policy and MPP program as 
examples, it is unclear whether the effectiveness or persuasiveness of communications 
 
5 Leandra Bernstein, “DHS Has Always Had High Leadership Turnover; It’s Getting Worse under 
Trump,” NBC Montana, November 4, 2019, https://nbcmontana.com/news/nation-world/dhs-has-always-
had-high-leadership-turnover-its-getting-worse-under-trump; Jerry Markon, Ellen Nakashima, and Alice 
Crites, “Turnover at Top Levels Hampers Department of Homeland Security,” Washington Post, 
September 21, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-level-turnover-makes-it-harder-for-dhs-
to-stay-on-top-of-evolving-threats/2014/09/21/ca7919a6-39d7-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html. 
6 Molly O’Toole, “Must Reads: John F. Kelly Says His Tenure as Trump’s Chief of Staff Is Best 
Measured by What the President Did Not Do,” Los Angeles Times, December 30, 2018, https://www.
latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-john-kelly-exit-interview-20181230-story.html; Chaos and Crisis: Senior 
Trump Admin Officials Implicated in Child Separation (Washington, DC: Restore Public Trust, 2019), 
https://restorepublictrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/20190406-RPT-OpenLetterCorporateAmerica-
FINAL-1.pdf. 
7 “Family Separation under the Trump Administration—A Timeline,” Southern Poverty Law Center, 
June 17, 2020, https://www.splcenter.org/news/2020/06/17/family-separation-under-trump-administration-
timeline; “Migrant Protection Protocols,” Department of Homeland Security, January 24, 2019, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols. 
3 
plays a visible or strategic role in communications development and messaging for DHS.8 
Other policy rollouts, such as a variety of reforms to the asylum system—or attempts to 
dismantle existing policies, depending on perspective—have been better received but 
continue to face uphill battles in the courts.9 A 2019 DHS-wide report with “information 
on the Department’s Strategic Review and . . . Agency Priority Goals” contains only two 
isolated references to strategic communications successes. Both examples were in the 
context of communications by the Transportation Security Administration directed toward 
travelers, but there was nothing regarding immigration enforcement.10  
The problem of why around half of the U.S. population holds unfavorable opinions 
of DHS’s enforcement mission and work is a thorny, possibly unsolvable problem.11 A 
2018 Pew study showed that “about as many Americans view [ICE] favorably (44%) as 
unfavorably (47%).”12 DHS’s enforcement activities are ripe for public discourse and 
targeted strategic communications aimed at achieving public understanding, and possibly 
even greater support, in these areas. The migrant communities and stakeholders that are 
 
8 Darrel W. Stephens, Julia Hill, and Sheldon Greenberg, Strategic Communication Practices: A 
Toolkit for Police Executives (Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2011), 13, 
https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p222-pub.pdf; Muzaffar Chishti, Sarah Pierce, and Jessica 
Bolter, “Muscular Public Relations Strategy to Paint Immigrants and Immigration as Negatives Embedded 
Deep within Trump Executive Orders,” Migration Policy Institute, March 22, 2017, https://www.
migrationpolicy.org/article/muscular-public-relations-strategy-paint-immigrants-and-immigration-
negatives-embedded-deep. 
9 David Inserra, “Seeking Asylum: Congress Should Fix Critical Loopholes to Secure the Southern 
Border and Help the Persecuted,” Heritage Foundation, May 7, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/
immigration/report/seeking-asylum-congress-should-fix-critical-loopholes-secure-the-southern-border; 
Robert Barnes, “Supreme Court Says Trump Administration Can Begin Denying Asylum to Migrants 
While Legal Fight Continues,” Washington Post, September 11, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/courts_law/supreme-court-says-trump-administration-can-begin-denying-migrants-asylum-while-
legal-fight-continues/2019/09/11/94b90da4-d017-11e9-8c1c-7c8ee785b855_story.html. 
10 Department of Homeland Security, FY2018-2020 Annual Performance Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 78, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_
0318_MGMT_CBJ-Annual-Performance-Review-DHS-Overview_0.pdf. 
11 Such problems have been called “wicked” in the literature. Jos C. N. Raadschelders, Jennica 
Larrison, and Aditi V. Thapar, “Refugee Migration as a ‘Wicked Problem’: American Controlling, 
Palliative, and Governance Policies in Global Context,” World Affairs 182, no. 3 (September 2019): 230, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0043820019864103; Stephens, Hill, and Greenberg, Strategic Communication 
Practices, 77. For a discussion of the relationship between political polarization and the increasing view 
that DHS enforcement serves the Republican Party’s interests, see Kleinfeld, “Politicization.” 
12 Pew Research Center, Growing Partisan Differences in Views of the FBI; Stark Divide over ICE 
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2018), https://www.people-press.org/2018/07/24/growing-
partisan-differences-in-views-of-the-fbi-stark-divide-over-ice/. 
4 
targeted by DHS’s enforcement activities are populations whose very existence and 
presence in the United States may be threatened by increased enforcement. The main 
“customers” of DHS’s enforcement activities are the populations seeking to illegally cross 
the border (in the case of CBP) and the population of individuals who are unlawfully 
present in the United States (in the case of ICE). Naturally, neither of these populations 
wants or appreciates DHS’s presence to the extent such presence is disruptive to their 
attempts to enter or illegally remain in the United States. Such stakeholders can be termed 
an adversarial population.13  
Although the public benefits from general enforcement of the law, including 
immigration and border-related laws, the public is not a direct consumer of DHS’s 
enforcement efforts. Critics of such enforcement argue that DHS’s enforcement activities 
destroy families, weaken communities, and unfairly target people of color.14 At times, 
DHS has struggled with connecting concrete, tangible problems with its enforcement 
priorities and strategic communications efforts, arguably resulting in unfavorable public 
opinion about the agency.15 Achieving a greater understanding of DHS’s efforts in these 
areas may lead to improvement in DHS’s ability to communicate with the public about 
enforcement matters and improve its effectiveness at achieving its enforcement goals.16 
According to the DHS Inspector General, managers and leaders in roles responsible 
for the rollout of policies should be expected to have training, education, and background 
 
13 For a few examples of the limited academic use of the term “adversarial population,” see Gideon 
Van Riet, “Intermediating between Conflict and Security: Private Security Companies as Infrastructures of 
Security in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Politikon 47, no. 1 (January 2020): 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/
02589346.2020.1714282; Ralph Hartley, “Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on Mixed Identity in the 
Context of Violent Conflict,” Social Identities 16, no. 2 (March 2010): 238, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13504631003691058; Caitlin Gokey and Susan Shah, eds., How to Serve Diverse Communities, Police 
Perspectives: Building Trust in a Diverse Nation 2 (Washington, DC: Vera Institute of Justice, 2016), vii, 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/police-perspectives-guide-series-building-trust-diverse-
nation-diverse-communities_1.pdf. 
14 United We Dream and Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Ending Local Collaboration with ICE: A 
Toolkit for Immigrant Advocates (Washington, DC: United We Dream, 2015), 21, https://www.ilrc.org/
sites/default/files/resources/toolkit_final.compressed.pdf. 
15 For a brief discussion of the difficulties in communicating with the public regarding immigration 
policy, see Stephens, Hill, and Greenberg, Strategic Communication Practices, 13. 
16 Bobbie L. Johnson, “Managing the Reputation of DHS and Its Components” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), https://doi.org/10.1037/e662172010-001. 
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in strategic communications to tackle any public relations challenges associated with 
controversial policy rollouts.17 Ideally, DHS would make a strong case to the public and 
stakeholders to sell the idea that policy problems exist before rolling out proposed solutions 
to solve them. This thesis research asks whether the communications output of DHS during 
the parent-child separation policy and MPP reflects these strategic principles. 
This thesis examines how DHS employs strategic communications while doing its 
job enforcing immigration law and whether such communications appear aimed at 
increasing the public’s understanding of DHS’s enforcement policies. The thesis reviews 
existing public communications theories and builds upon them to develop a working model 
to measure the effectiveness of the output of strategic communications, which is 
appropriate for use by a large federal law enforcement agency such as DHS. The project 
results in a deeper understanding of DHS’s communications successes and failures, as well 
as several policy recommendations addressing future communications issues. More 
generally, these recommendations should have wider import to other large non-DHS 
agencies, particularly those struggling with strategic communications challenges. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How does DHS conduct strategic communications about controversial immigration 
policies, and can analysis of such communications using an evaluation metric or framework 
provide insight into DHS’s strengths and weaknesses in this area? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW: WHERE IS THE STRATEGY IN “STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATIONS”? 
The literature contains several subject areas that provide the necessary academic 
framework and tools of analysis for this project. These areas include discussion of strategy 
in general, strategic communications, methods of measurement and evaluation, and 
models of measurement. Subtopics within these general areas include information 
fratricide and information end-states.  
 
17 Office of Inspector General, Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security, OIG-18-11 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2017), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-11/OIG-18-11-Nov17.pdf. 
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1. Bad Strategy Is Commonplace 
The starting point is the debate over what should be considered effective and 
ineffective descriptions and implementation of strategy for an organization. Observing the 
confusion in the literature on strategy is helpful for understanding the nuances of the term 
strategic communications, particularly for adopting the critical perspective needed to 
research the nebulous subject. The use of the broader term strategy varies on a spectrum, 
ranging from broad usage to accomplish any sort of goal setting and long-term planning by 
an organization to narrower usage focused on capitalizing on a handful of key strengths of 
an agency to overcome specific challenges. The broader majority is exemplified by Dulek 
and Campbell’s oversimplified view: “Strategy at its simplest form is the goal that the 
strategist wants to achieve.”18 The research of Hallahan et al. analyzes the use of the term 
strategic in the context of strategic communications and notes several prominent uses. For 
example, for communications to be considered strategic, they “privilege [] a management 
discourse and emphasize [] upper management’s goals for the organization as given and 
legitimate.”19 This usage implies that strategy simply refers to the location on the 
organizational chart where decisions are made.20  
Multiple authors agree that the use of the term strategy originated in warfare and is 
associated with power and decision-making, particularly by those at the “strategic apex” 
of an agency.21 The term “evokes a one-sided approach to organizational management” 
while also being associated with organization survival and efficiency.22 Although there is 
 
18 Ronald E. Dulek and Kim Sydow Campbell, “On the Dark Side of Strategic Communication,” 
International Journal of Business Communication 52, no. 1 (January 2015): 124, https://doi.org/10.1177/
2329488414560107. 
19 Kirk Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” International Journal of Strategic 
Communication 1, no. 1 (December 2007): 11, https://doi.org/10.1080/15531180701285244. 
20 Hallahan et al., 11. 
21 Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 12; Jim Macnamara and Anne Gregory, 
“Expanding Evaluation to Progress Strategic Communication: Beyond Message Tracking to Open 
Listening,” International Journal of Strategic Communication 12, no. 4 (2018): 470, https://doi.org/
10.1080/1553118X.2018.1450255; H. Mintzberg, The Structure of Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1979). 
22 Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 11, 13; Charles Perrow, “Organisational 
Theorists in a Society of Organizations,” International Sociology 7, no. 3 (September 1992): 371–80, 
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F026858092007003008. 
7 
a fair amount of agreement on strategy’s historical origins, the confusion sets in when 
scholars and practitioners attempt to define sound practices in terms of effective or well-
articulated strategy. 
To point out these failing practices, Richard Rumelt lambasted (throughout several 
articles and a book) the phenomenon of “bad strategy.” In his view, “good strategy” 
involves “identifying pivot points that can multiply the effectiveness of effort.”23 In 
contrast to other scholars, his definition of Good Strategy includes a deep awareness of an 
organization’s key strengths, or pivot points. As discussed in this thesis, the terms Good or 
Bad Strategy refer to Rumelt’s research into and characterizations of effective versus 
ineffective strategy, and references to these concepts in this thesis are capitalized.  
According to Rumelt, truly Good Strategy requires introspection, self-honesty, and 
a thoughtfully developed approach to overcome real challenges, while Bad Strategy is a de 
facto checklist of “broad goals, ambition, vision [,] and values.”24 He recommends 
avoiding the conflation of goals with strategy, especially long-term goals that no one knows 
how to achieve or when they will be achievable. Rather, the more immediate work of the 
strategist is specifically to “create the conditions that will make the push effective.”25  
In Rumelt’s view, the hallmark of Good Strategy includes a focus “on one, or a 
very few, pivotal objectives” rather than a laundry list of lofty goals.26 Maintaining focus 
on these crucial objectives should “lead to a cascade of favorable outcomes.”27 In sum, 
Good Strategy has a diagnosis of a challenge, a guiding policy of how to deal with 
obstacles, and coherent actions tailored to overcoming these obstacles and achieving the 
guiding policy.28 This understanding is in contrast to the majority view and more common 
 






28 Rumelt, “Perils of Bad Strategy”; Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy: The Difference 
and Why It Matters (New York: Crown Business, 2011), 7. 
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articulation of strategy as simply a “goal that the strategist wants to achieve.”29 Although 
Rumelt may be a minority voice in the strategy literature, he nonetheless offers an avenue 
for sorting out effective and ineffective use of strategy in the field of public 
communications. 
2. Strategic Communications: Top-Down and Planned, or Emergent and 
Inclusive? 
The literature on strategic communications includes ongoing debate about the 
extent to which communications strategy can be planned from the top down, or if it is 
something less palpable that emerges through an organization’s interaction with 
stakeholders. As early as 1979, the literature on strategic communications demonstrated 
that the skill of communicating effectively was increasingly required and important for all 
participants in the public sphere.30 The point of strategic communications is not to make 
the entire public love an organization or to allow an agency to pursue offensive policies. 
Instead, it is to create support and consensus for efforts to do good and make correct 
decisions.31 In this vein, Hallahan et al. posit that “effective strategic communication 
includes examining how an organization presents itself in society as a social actor in the 
creation of public culture and the discussion of public issues.”32 Despite these noble 
claims, the field has traditionally taken a top-down approach, focused on achieving 
organizational goals rather than communicating in “ways that meet the needs or interests 
of stakeholders and publics.”33 Holthauzen’s 2013 research, which still favors the interests 
of the organization, “refers to ‘set [ting]’ goals with no reference to stakeholders or 
publics,” suggesting a lack of consensus on the proper orientation of communications 
 
29 Ronald E. Dulek and Kim Sydow Campbell, “On the Dark Side of Strategic Communication,” 
International Journal of Business Communication 52, no. 1 (2015): 124, https://doi.org/10.1177/
2329488414560107. 
30 Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 15; Jürgen Habermas, Communication and 
the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979). 
31 Christopher Paul, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 175. 
32 Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 27. 
33 Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation,” 470. 
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within the literature of strategic communications.34 This lack of consensus signals 
confusion about whether ideal communications are driven by an organization’s concerns 
from the top down or if stakeholder needs from the bottom up must play a role. 
3. Who Are the Strategic Communicators in an Organization? 
Part of the literature discusses who the decision-makers are vis-à-vis the actual 
practitioners of strategic communications, sparking debate about who in an organization 
should bear the responsibility for effective communications planning. Buhmann and 
Likely, relying on Brønn’s 2011 research, suggest that practitioners “be active members of 
the top management team where strategic decisions are taken.”35 Any envisioned cycle or 
model of strategic communications that views it as part of a linear progression—
culminating in evaluation by practitioners separate and apart from the actual decision-
makers—is erroneous and lacks rigor and utility. Instead, managers and communications 
practitioners should be more integrated from the beginning.36 Buhmann and Likely further 
note that good strategy is “formed and re-formed rather than [pre]formulated.”37 
Macnamara and Gregory note that the measurement and evaluation process can provide 
insight into strategy development and allow a practitioner “to observe the concepts and 
principles applied in practice.”38 Measurement and evaluation are thus as useful for 
planning purposes as they are for analyzing results.39 
 
34 Derina R. Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfaß, “Strategic Communication—Pillars and Perspectives of 
an Alternative Paradigm,” in Organisationskommunikation und Public Relations, ed. Ansgar Zerfaß, Lars 
Rademacher, and Stefan Wehmeier (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013), 73–94, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
531-18961-1_4; Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation,” 470. 
35 Alexander Buhmann and Fraser Likely, “Evaluation and Measurement in Strategic 
Communication,” in The International Encyclopedia of Strategic Communication, ed. Robert L. Heath and 
Winni Johansen (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2018), 3; Peggy S. Brønn, “Communication Managers as 
Strategists? Can They Make the Grade?,” Journal of Communication Management 5, no. 4 (October 2001): 
313–26, https://doi.org/10.1108/13632540110806857. 
36 Buhmann and Likely, “Evaluation and Measurement,” 3. 
37 Buhmann and Likely, 3. 
38 Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation,” 469, 473. 
39 Macnamara and Gregory, 473. 
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Other research discusses in technical detail the roles of various staff. For an agency 
such as DHS, of interest to this project are the identified roles of public relations and 
political communication staff.40 Adherents of the possibility of emergent strategy, as 
discussed below, reject the notion that lower-level communication technicians merely 
execute “strategic” decisions made higher up in the food chain.41 Further, literature on 
contemporary management, such as Mirabeau and Maguire’s 2014 article, discusses the 
“need to change from a top-down ‘command and control’ approach in which senior 
management predetermines strategy unilaterally inside the organization to one that . . . is 
adaptive.”42  
What does the literature generally say about the effectiveness and purpose of 
strategic communications? The consensus—again, from the top-down perspective—is that 
effectiveness is “achieving a desired communication result against a pre-set objective . . . 
[while] monitor [ing] the organization’s environment, thus increasing the reflective 
capacities of strategic management decisions.”43 Definitions of the term strategic 
communications range from Buhmann and Likely’s somewhat circular definition—“any 
purposeful use of communication to fulfill an organization’s mission and strategy”—to 
broader notions that strategic communications are not limited to corporations or 
governments but also may be used by “activist organizations and social and citizen 
movements.”44 Casting the field as an “emerging paradigm,” Hallahan et al. note that 
“various communications disciplines share common purposes and that their objectives and 
strategies for achieving those objectives are similar.”45 Perhaps, in losing meaning through 
overuse, the term has become synonymous with public relations, political persuasion, and 
 
40 Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 6. 
41 Hallahan et al., 14. 
42 Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation,” 472; Laurent Mirabeau and Steve Maguire, 
“From Autonomous Strategic Behavior to Emergent Strategy,” Strategic Management Journal 35, no. 8 
(August 2014): 1202–29, https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2149. 
43 Buhmann and Likely, “Evaluation and Measurement,” 4, 5. 
44 Buhmann and Likely, 5; Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 4. 
45 Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 5. 
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characterized crisis communications.46 Foucault’s somewhat cynical view as early as 1982 
was that “all relationships are political and therefore strategic.”47 
4. A Darker Perspective on Communications 
Some authors reject an overly naive view of organizational communication in 
discussing the so-called “dark side” of strategic communications and related notions of 
emergence.48 Dulek and Campbell suggest that focusing the message on the purpose and 
sender rather than the context and recipient engages the Dark Side of strategic 
communications.49 They suggest that “ambiguity, and even deception, may be appropriate 
choices, depending on strategic intent.”50 This perspective, of course, disregards the 
earlier, perhaps more noble, idea that communication must be as clear as possible such that 
clarity becomes a goal even unto itself.51  
To be sure, excessive pursuit of clarity in messaging can interfere with a legitimate 
strategic purpose, just as ambiguity can be “normal rather than deviational.”52 Indeed, the 
strategic literature is replete with studies of methods used for creating intentional 
ambiguity.53 More technically, authors have found that “implicature ambiguity is often the 
 
46 Hallahan et al., 9. 
47 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, ed. H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rainbow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Hallahan 
et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 15. 
48 As noted above in the discussion of Good or Bad Strategy, references to seemingly normative 
concepts such as the Dark Side of strategic communications are capitalized in this thesis as a stylistic 
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and not to pass judgment on aspects of communications which authors from the literature might call “dark.” 
49 Dulek and Campbell, “On the Dark Side,” 123; Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation,” 
471. 
50 Dulek and Campbell, “On the Dark Side,” 122. 
51 Dulek and Campbell, 122, 136; C. W. Shannon and W. W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949). 
52 Dulek and Campbell, “On the Dark Side,” 123; Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power: Why Some People Have It—
and Others Don’t (New York: HarperCollins, 2010); Eric M. Eisenberg, “Ambiguity as Strategy in 
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foundation of deceptive messages.”54 Ambiguous interpretations are traceable to 
disparities in information awareness, or information asymmetry, between individuals with 
varying amounts of knowledge about an event or subject.55 The strategic actor, of course, 
has the deliberate choice of attempting to resolve such information asymmetries or 
intentionally allowing ambiguity to persist.56 This choice raises the question of whether it 
is ever ethical for government to be less than perfectly clear.57 Dozier’s earlier 2013 
writings support Dulek’s point, noting that organizations with “publicity/press agentry 
model [s] . . . spread favorable propaganda about the organization with only moderate 
regard for information accuracy.”58 
Conversely, and related to the Dark Side, astroturfing (essentially a planned and 
false information campaign) should be avoided.59 If the deception is revealed, it will 
damage the organization’s reputation significantly.60 Paul’s volume provides more 
extensive discussion of what he terms “black information capabilities,” such as his 
recommendations that such activities be separated within an organization from more 
traditional communications functions.61 While Paul’s research and writings focus 
primarily on the military/defense aspect of strategic communications, broader value can be 
gleaned from his belief that successful efforts in stakeholder engagement will result in 
 
54 Dulek and Campbell, 128. 
55 Dulek and Campbell, 130. 
56 Dulek and Campbell, 136. 
57 Dulek and Campbell, 136. 
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“maximum credibility, increased respect, and as much support for our policies and 
operations as possible.”62  
5. Communications Strategy Can Emerge Unintentionally 
A newer trend and ongoing debate in the strategic communications literature 
concerns the intent required to engage in strategy or whether strategy emerges even where 
it is unintended. To be sure, the public “do [es] not necessarily differentiate between the 
various forms of communications in which [agencies] might engage.”63 In this respect, 
there is an unintentional aspect of strategic communications rooted in the variation and 
unpredictability of public perception.64 Moreover, as Hallahan et al. describe, 
“Postmodern philosophers . . . hold that meaning is solely shaped by the receiver, who 
receives communication and creates meaning within the context of her or his own life 
experiences and references.”65 Attempts at significant control over the meaning of 
messaging are arguably illusory because the “meaning of communication itself is 
‘irretrievably transformed’ during the communication process.”66 Thus, Hallahan et al. 
recognized that it might not be possible to get others to think as an organization would like 
them to think. Indeed, a linear understanding of communications may no longer be possible 
or realistic.67 A more realistic goal is to have a target audience understand an agency’s 
efforts rather than be persuaded by them, so managers should set their expectations 
accordingly.68 Nonetheless, the debate over emergence is far from settled. As recently as 
2015, Schneider still harkened back to the top-down strategic approach in recognizing the 
 
62 Paul, 175. 
63 Hallahan et al., “Defining Strategic Communication,” 10. 
64 Hallahan et al., 10. 
65 Hallahan et al., 24. 
66 Hallahan et al., 24. 
67 Hallahan et al., 26. 
68 Hallahan et al., 26. 
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so-called “‘rise of strategic communication’ in government . . . with a primary focus on 
changing the attitudes and behaviour of target audiences”—if that can still be done.69 
Significant disagreement exists as to whether strategic communications can be 
unintentional or emergent, such as the argument of Hallahan et al. that the “purposeful 
nature of strategic communications is critical” and that “random or unintentional 
communications” are not strategic.70 Likewise, in a 2012 text about DHS in particular, 
Thomas and Logan agree that strategic communication is an “intentional, choice-based 
process.”71 Scholars such as King note that strategy emerges regardless of speaker intent, 
despite any planned actions to achieve intended results.72 Carried to their full conclusion, 
King’s writings beg the question of whether DHS’s attempts at strategic communications 
matter at all. It is unresolved in the literature how to reconcile the two camps’ views, as the 
disagreement appears to be rooted in a fundamental divergence of opinion in the nature of 
strategy itself. 
Regardless of whether King’s theory of emergence merits wider acceptance and 
application, several points from her research stand out for this current project. First, King 
believes “emergent strategies may be taken as deliberate by the audience, regardless of 
whether the strategy was planned for or not.”73 Next, emergent strategy, to the extent it 
exists, “will not necessarily be stable over time because the construct is inherently 
dynamic.”74 Finally, King notes that “a strategy relies on the interdependence of opposing 
participants” for both planned and emergent communications strategies, much as the 
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74 King, 23. 
15 
justification for DHS’s enforcement work relies on the existence of terrorists, illegal aliens, 
and criminal aliens.75  
Overall, in contrast to Rumelt’s research, King’s notion of strategy appears to be 
just a stand-in for the result of competitive circumstances. In King’s view, “strategy” is 
what emerges following a contentious competition “in which writers and speakers attempt 
to gain advantage over other forces that compete for their audience’s attention.”76 She also 
diverges from the work of more traditional scholars in her idea that “communication is 
strategic even if it is not intentional.”77 However, such divergence is ultimately 
unsurprising when there is no clear agreement on what “strategy” is. 
Other less orthodox views on strategy include the notion of participatory strategy, 
which includes wide stakeholder engagement, also referred to as democratizing strategy or 
open strategy.78 In their work on participatory strategy, Falkheimer and Heide argue that 
future “strategic communications between organizations and stakeholders will be less 
relevant to the larger question of how common meaning is created,” assuming it is still 
possible to have common meaning between adversarial populations and organizations.79 
In their view, the “boundaries between transmitter and receiver” are less clear and other 
boundaries will continue to blur.80 Thus, analysis of participatory strategy recognizes the 
downstream effects of stakeholder interaction on an organization’s initial, planned strategy. 
6. Failures of Consistency: Information Fratricide 
Sometimes planned strategy fails due to adverse internal influences. Information 
fratricide occurs when one component or official of an agency releases public information 
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or statements which undercut another component’s or official’s work.81 In the military, 
information fratricide is defined as “employing information operations elements in a way 
that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly 
operations or adversely affect friendly forces.”82 This phenomenon can happen indirectly 
when information from competing friendly voices “create improper impressions” on the 
listener.83 Defined in this way, it is possible that “information fratricide” occurs within 
DHS, at least to the extent that one component’s policies or public statements can 
negatively impact casework, adjudications, or enforcement actions of other components.84   
In sum, the literature on strategic communications suggests it is still an immature 
science, composed of loosely related theories.85 Certainly, the field has evolved from one 
characterized by a unitary, top-level source disseminating information to one where 
consumers of information actively seek out the information they want.86 Today, the many 
communicate with many, with sometimes unexpected effects.87 The literature has only 
begun to scratch the surface of these changes in understanding of the field.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is essentially a qualitative study of media reporting and public 
communications of DHS relevant to several case studies. According to principles laid out 
in Leedy and Ormrod’s Practical Research Planning and Design, the case study is the most 
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applicable and useful methodology for this project.88 This type of research design is best 
suited to study a given event or events over a specific period. Leedy and Ormrod note that 
such usage is helpful where there is the goal of “mak [ing] comparisons, build [ing] theory, 
or propos [ing] generalizations.”89 The research question for this thesis has exactly those 
aims, as it seeks to understand how DHS performs strategic communications and to identify 
strengths and weaknesses in this area. To answer this question, the communications 
regarding two DHS policy rollouts from 2018–19 are viewed from an outsider perspective, 
meaning that the project focuses on publicly available communications and media 
reporting.  
The research for this project occurred in several phases, and the following is a 
general overview of the path taken by the project. The research first identified in the 
literature viable possibilities to use for measurement and evaluation of DHS’s 
organizational communications. As discussed in Chapter II, several viable candidate 
models were identified and then synthesized into a new model better tailored to evaluation 
of specific DHS communications. The project identified appropriate case studies and 
collected publicly available documents such as newspaper and internet articles, press 
releases, journal and law review articles, congressional testimony, and public speeches by 
key officials relevant to the chosen two case studies. Of particular interest were 
organizational communications that appeared to be targeted to a specific audience. 
Excluded from review and analysis were less scholarly or academic opinion pieces on the 
merits of DHS’s policy actions or inactions, which lack focus on DHS’s communications.  
In analyzing these events, the thesis discusses the “historical, economic, and social 
factors” relevant to the analysis, factors which Leedy and Ormrod identified as appropriate 
for the case study method.90 The thesis is not an analysis of data regarding the legal, moral, 
political, or public policy merits of DHS’s actions during these events. The purpose of this 
thesis is to discuss and apply concepts from the strategic communications literature in a 
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non-normative, academic manner and not to pass judgment on any “good” or “bad” aspects 
of DHS’s policy or communications. While specific policy issues are certainly worth 
serious academic study, they are outside the scope of this thesis and involve complex issues 
of modern politics and immigration policy. Instead, the research focuses on the specific 
communications strategies (especially the actual communications documents and public 
statements themselves) employed by DHS and agency leadership during these policy 
rollouts and measures such strategies against a model for evaluating strategic 
communications efforts. Finally, the analysis uses the developed model to identify whether 
any apparent gaps exist in DHS’s use of strategic communications efforts. The following 
four sections provide further detail about the research design.  
1. Source Collection Methodology 
Source documents for this thesis consisted of published media articles, 
congressional reports, non-governmental organization (NGO) reports, official DHS press 
releases and other official DHS communications, and other published material which 
contained direct quotes or significant paraphrases of statements by key government 
officials regarding these two policies. These communications were located primarily 
through internet searches designed to capture communications relevant to these two 
policies, using keywords pulled from language in the policies. The communications were 
further located from a review of sections of the DHS website containing press releases and 
other public communications, and by following footnote and bibliography references of 
published works about these policies.  
Potential source documents were scanned to determine if they contained any direct 
quotes or significant paraphrases of statements by key administration officials about these 
two policies. If so, the source information and statements of the officials were cataloged 
for further analysis. Documents were generally not considered as source documents if they 
contained commentary about the policy merits but did not contain any direct quotes or 
significant paraphrases of key administration officials, because they did not contain any 
actual examples of communications. 
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To be sure, this research has not captured every single word uttered by key officials 
about these two policies. The goal was to identify the major public press releases, speeches, 
and other communications which defined the administration’s communications strategy (or 
lack of strategy) during these two policy rollouts.  
2. Qualitative Content Analysis 
The research methodology used in this thesis consists primarily of content analysis 
of the public speeches, press releases, quotations in the media, and other writings and 
documented communications of various DHS and governmental officials. Macnamara 
notes that a qualitative review method is useful to obtain “in-depth insights and 
understanding of particular cases, characteristics, categories, or groups of people.”91 This 
method can support “inferences about the policies, views, and intentions of various sources, 
as well as potential audience effects, without directly contacting those sources.”92 
Macnamara further describes content analysis as first identifying appropriate cases 
and communications.93 The analysis then turns to “examining the data to identify the 
topics, issues, and messages that most frequently occur, and then . . . making inferences 
about what those elements might reveal about the speakers, authors, or audience effects.”94 
The interpretive frame of “narratology, which focuses on the narrative or story-telling 
within a text to interpret what meanings are likely to be produced by its structure and choice 
of words,” is considered a useful tool for conducting a qualitative method of content 
analysis.95 This type of a qualitative method includes analysis of such elements as: 
adjectives depicting “a speaker’s and writer’s attitude”; “tonal qualities such as 
aggressiveness, sarcasm, flippancy, and emotional language”; “figures of speech such as 
 
91 Jim Macnamara, “Content Analysis,” in Mediated Communication, ed. Philip M. Napoli, vol. 7, 
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93 Macnamara, 11. 
94 Macnamara, 11. 
95 Macnamara, 11. 
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metaphors and similes”; use of “nuance, sarcasm, double-entendre, and other particular 
uses of language”; and other “context factors such as the credibility of spokespersons.”96 
Although such a qualitative research method may have inherent concerns of 
“introducing subjectivity and bias,” such concerns are mitigated by the presence of clear 
evaluation criteria.97 This thesis introduces a set of evaluation criteria with the output 
evaluation model developed in Chapter II. Further, the possibility of bias in case selection 
is minimized when the analysis includes “rationale that justifies why and how such cases 
are selected.”98 The rationale for selection of the two cases in this thesis is described below. 
3. Rationale for Case Selection 
Potential candidates for study were limited to policies of the Trump administration 
for several reasons. First, the idea for this thesis project arose during the height of the 
administration, when multiple controversial immigration policies were front and central in 
the collective minds of the public, the media, and DHS policymakers. These policies 
contrasted rather sharply with those of prior administrations, so it was natural to begin 
searching for appropriate case studies with the Trump administration. Second, broadening 
the search for cases to include those prior to the Trump administration necessarily 
introduces additional variables and adds to the complexity of the study. As Bowles 
remarked in his work on presidential studies, “there are usually too many variables to 
permit robust, comparative theories of political behavior and policy outcomes with cross-
national and intertemporal explanatory applicability [emphasis added].”99 Making 
“interesting generalizations,” particularly about a subject as underdeveloped as strategic 
communications for public agencies, is increasingly difficult for more than a “small . . . 
slice of time.”100 
 
96 Macnamara, 11. 
97 Macnamara, 10. 
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a. Why These Cases Were Chosen 
The parent-child separation policy was a public relations disaster, drawing near-
universal bipartisan condemnation from Congress, the media, and the public.101 It is also 
a good example of multiple administration officials at all management levels of DHS 
issuing public statements defending the policy. DHS communications regarding this 
criminal-enforcement-turned-child-separation policy merit study as the policy has been 
described by a media critic as “one of the worst crises of [Trump’s] presidency.”102 
MPP was chosen as the second case study because it is an example of another 
immigration-related policy of the Trump administration that was controversial yet played 
a key role in the administration’s overall immigration agenda. Indeed, it has been described 
by DHS as the “cornerstone” of the administration’s immigration policy.103 Beginning as 
a one-site pilot program in southern California, the program grew to seven sites across the 
border from San Diego (San Ysidro) to Brownsville, Texas.104 The MPP program did not 
garner significant criticism in the mainstream media or among the public, at least not to the 
extent that the parent-child separation policy was universally condemned. Indeed, many 
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members of the public have likely never heard of MPP, which is notable given DHS’s 
description of the program as a “cornerstone” policy.105  
Contrasted together, these two case studies raise questions of what Trump’s DHS 
did correctly and incorrectly in its efforts at strategic communications. Thus, this thesis 
focuses on two immigration policies from the Trump administration which fell on a 
spectrum from being near-universally condemned to having a favorable, or at least 
palatable, reception. 
b. Ruling Out Other Possible Case Studies 
Other possible policy case studies were considered but ruled out for various 
reasons. For example, the third country transit bar prevented an asylum seeker from being 
granted asylum if he or she had passed through a third country without first applying for 
asylum in the third country, waiting for a decision, and receiving a denial before continuing 
onward to the United States.106 Since almost all migrants arriving at the southern U.S. 
border pass through Mexico and several Central American countries, most were ineligible 
for asylum since they had not applied for asylum in those countries.107 Following litigation 
on the rule, it was enjoined in July 2020 by a federal district court judge in D.C.108 Further, 
the rule did not garner significant criticism in the mainstream media or among the public 
to the extent of the parent-child separation policy or MPP. The subject matter of the rule 
concerns a fairly niche area of asylum law, unlike the more fundamental effect of 
separating parents from children or requiring asylum seekers to remain in another country 
while their cases are pending. This rule was excluded as a case study for these reasons. 
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Another possible case study concerns the practice of “metering,” the practice where 
CBP allegedly prevents asylum seekers from entering a port of entry at a land border 
crossing and requires them to remain in Mexico until their name comes up on a waiting 
list, due to resource constraints at the ports of entry.109 The practice is controversial for 
multiple reasons and DHS has never directly acknowledged that such a practice exists or 
existed. Moreover, this practice has been litigated extensively in the pending Al Otro Lado 
litigation and there is currently an injunction in place at the time of this writing.110 To the 
extent that such alleged metering policies prevented asylum seekers from entering the 
country prior to the onset of the third country transit bar, the injunction essentially prohibits 
adjudicators from holding the late entry date into the U.S. against Al Otro Lado class 
members.111 The alleged metering policy is also a relatively niche area of asylum law 
related to the third country transit bar and was not selected as a case study for the same 
reasons as the third country transit bar. 
Another example policy is the safe third country agreement, with nations such as 
Guatemala, whereby the U.S. government and the third country enter into an agreement for 
the third country to accept and house asylum seekers from the United States.112 This 
program was implemented on a small scale with Guatemala prior to the onset of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, but it never had the scope or impact of a much larger program such 
as MPP and a Guatemalan court initially blocked its further implementation in mid-
2019.113 The administration reportedly began sending small numbers of migrants to 
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Guatemala under the agreement by November 2019.114 This program was not selected as 
a case study due to the limited scope of the program as it existed before the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
c. Conclusion 
The most informative policy cases using appropriate “non-probability sampling” 
methods are the parent-child separation policy and the Migrant Protection Protocols.115 
The parent-child separation policy is suitable for analysis due to the magnitude of the 
public outrage following the rollout of the policy and the diversity of DHS’s public 
communications regarding the rollout. The MPP program is appropriate as it has been self-
described by DHS as the “cornerstone” of the administration’s immigration policy.116 For 
the chosen case studies, the breadth of available source documents is quite significant. The 
section below discusses the need to narrow down the range of source documents to 
meaningfully analyze DHS’s communications on these two policies within the scope of 
this thesis. 
4. Excluded Subjects, Types of Communications, and Speakers 
Key Trump administration officials issued numerous statements about policy 
developments related to the two case studies over the four years of the administration. For 
purposes of this thesis, it was necessary to narrow down the scope of data collection and 
exclude certain subjects, types of communications, and speakers to achieve a manageable 
body of source documents. Discussion of the excluded issues, types of communications, 
and speaker statements are left to future researchers and writers.  
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Accordingly, the following list of subjects, types of communications, and speakers 
were intentionally excluded from data collection and analysis in this thesis for the reasons 
stated: 
• Statements or testimony of officials of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS). The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), a 
part of HHS, assumes and maintains custody of unaccompanied alien 
minors after arrest by DHS.117 ORR was involved with maintaining 
custody of children after parent-child separations in 2018. However, 
statements of HHS officials are excluded because it is a separate Cabinet-
level department with a different mission, operational environment, and 
set of interests than DHS. 
• Statements or testimony of officials of the Department of Justice, other 
than the Attorney General. There are available statements from lower-
ranking DOJ officials, such as from U.S. Attorneys. However, these 
officials were largely carrying out policy orders from higher-ranking DOJ 
officials and their statements do not necessarily reflect the position of 
DHS. Since the focus of this thesis is on strategic communications of DHS 
(along with a few high-ranking non-DHS officials such as the U.S. 
Attorney General, whose role is intricately tied to immigration policy and 
enforcement), communications from lower-level DOJ employees were 
excluded from consideration. 
• Statements of DHS and DOJ when serving as the legal representative of 
DHS contained in various court filings in the multitude of litigation filed 
against DHS during the Trump administration. These filings were 
prepared by attorneys rather than communications professionals and are 
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subject to legal ethics guidelines and requirements beyond the scope of 
this thesis. This thesis focuses primarily on communications issued by 
communications departments or political appointees of the relevant 
agencies. Further, many of these lawsuits remain in active litigation in 
various stages and it would be premature to comment on these filings. 
• Statements made on Twitter by President Donald Trump. These 
communications are not formal releases by communications professionals. 
Further, the evaluation model introduced in Chapter II does not capture the 
nuances of communication via Twitter or other social media, and further 
research is needed into evaluation of output via those media, particularly 
with regard to the frequency and extent that President Trump used Twitter 
to communicate with the public.118 While these tweets are related to the 
strategic communications of the U.S. government as a whole, it is difficult 
to sufficiently isolate for analysis the public relations effects of these 
tweets vis-à-vis more formal DHS communications within the scope of 
this thesis. 
• Statements from prior administration officials who were no longer serving 
in government, such as officials from the Obama Administration. The 
focus of this thesis is on the strategic communications efforts of DHS 
during the Trump administration, so the personal opinions of former 
officials evaluating those communications were excluded. 
• Statements quoted from internal memoranda obtained by the media, which 
were leaked or otherwise not intended for public release. While these 
statements are relevant to policy analysis, they are less relevant to 
analyzing public communications output because they were not intended 
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for public release. In theory, such released material may have had indirect 
effects upon subsequent public communications and indeed may form part 
of the emergent strategy discussed in Chapter II. However, such second-
order effects are speculative and the issue of downstream effects of 
releases of non-public material is an issue better suited for future research. 
• Statements or comments from any sources from March 2020 and later 
related to asylum policy and COVID-19. COVID-19 does not affect the 
discussion of the child separation policy (the first case study) due to the 
timing. However, the pandemic directly impacts the discussion of MPP 
(the second case study), since the MPP program was placed on hold at the 
beginning of the pandemic in late March 2020.119 It will never be known 
how long or in what manner MPP might have continued and what 
communications might have been issued post-March 2020. Because issues 
related to COVID-19 remain fluid, uncertain, and will merit future 
research, any statements regarding the effect of COVID-19 on MPP are 
excluded from discussion in this thesis. Future research into the 
government-wide impacts of COVID-19 should include the suspension of 
MPP and COVID-19’s general impact on immigration enforcement 
policy. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis continues with Chapter II which discusses the distinct body of literature 
in the field of measurement and evaluation (M&E) of communications and focuses on how 
to measure the strategic communications output of a large agency such as DHS. The 
chapter reviews existing M&E models and introduces a new model for use in evaluating 
the communications output of DHS. 
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In Chapters III and IV, public communications from DHS and other government 
leaders are discussed in the parent-child separation case study from 2017–2018 and MPP 
from 2019–2020. Chapter III reviews the various justifications offered by DHS and 
government officials for the rollout of the parent-child separation policy and discusses 
conflicts in messaging. Chapter IV turns to the MPP case study and walks through DHS 
communications on the policy rollout in a methodical, chronological fashion.  
Chapter V contains a critical evaluation of these two case studies, walking through 
and applying the sections of the evaluation model devoted to stakeholders, strategy, 
messaging, and language. 
Finally, Chapter VI begins with a synthesis of these findings and offers general 
policy recommendations for DHS and other large law enforcement agencies to maximize 
the effectiveness of their strategic communications efforts. The chapter further discusses 
several lingering issues which are suited for future research. 
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II. TOWARD OBJECTIVE MEASUREMENT OF 
THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS OUTPUT OF DHS 
“What gets measured is what gets done in organizations,” or so goes management 
writer Tom Peters’s oft-quoted insight.120 The literature discusses in depth the increasing 
“pressure for accountability and improvement” in sophisticated evaluation capability.121 
Yet for all of the academic interest in measurement and evaluation (M&E), it has not 
translated into widespread application in strategic communications practice.122   
An initial hurdle of this thesis research is identifying appropriate and useful metrics 
and factors to use to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of DHS’s strategic 
communications efforts. This chapter discusses the literature on M&E of communications, 
with an eye toward measuring the strategic communications output of DHS. The chapter 
reviews existing M&E models and the work of researchers such as Jim Macnamara and 
concludes that none of the extant models are sufficiently detailed to answer the research 
question presented in this thesis. The chapter then introduces and explains the development 
of a new stakeholder-centric model for use in evaluating the strategic communications 
output of DHS, which includes sections on stakeholder equities, types of strategy, 
messaging considerations, and language formulation. 
A. MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATIONS OUTPUT 
Studies of evaluation methods have been a major focus over the past fifty years, yet 
it is not clear that evaluation does what it is supposed to do.123 This section surveys the 
history of the M&E field, including existing models for measurement of communications. 
For starters, the careful scholar and practitioner should distinguish between the distinct 
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practices of measurement and evaluation, heeding Macnamara’s warning that practitioners 
and academics alike have erroneously fused these two concepts.124 The two are not 
interchangeable, as evaluation has “distinct qualities that are quite different to 
measurement and research.”125   
Buhmann and Likely’s research identifies conceptual, historical, and critical 
perspectives on evaluation in the strategic communications literature.126 The conceptual 
perspective literature describes formative evaluation research, such as “organizational 
listening, environmental scanning, and public opinion research,” as overall types of 
evaluation processes.127 Next, process evaluation involves assessing “whether processes 
are ‘on track’” with planned objectives. This real-time type of evaluation occurs 
contemporaneously with the strategic communications activity being studied.128 Third, 
summative evaluation makes a post hoc inquiry into alignment between results and 
objectives.129 Macnamara’s 2014 research confirmed a frequent backward-looking focus 
in a study of numerous corporate M&E reports.130 However, this notion of summative 
evaluation was rejected by Watson and Noble based on the belief that proper evaluation 
occurs at the planning stages of communications, rather than “something done at the end 
of a program.”131 
Recent literature on evaluation seeks to answer two broad questions: how to 
evaluate effectiveness of communications, and where to find or how to create valid and 
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reliable models or measures.132 The debate has shifted from analysis of the reach of 
messaging to reviewing effects on stakeholders, as well as how to explain the value of 
strategic communications internally to the organization.133   
Existing evaluation models date back decades and more or less resemble input/
output logic models.134 Likely and Watson’s summary of research from 1977 to 2012 
indicates that Grunig’s extensive pioneering research helped “bridg [e] the gap between 
academic research and practitioner research on measurement and evaluation” and 
application of theory.135 Earlier models during this period focused on using opinion 
research which must be “precisely evaluated.”136 The sophistication of models has 
increased over the years as they moved from mass communications theory and began 
incorporating concepts from fields such as program evaluation.137 Nonetheless, as Salter 
and Kothari note in their paper on realist evaluation, traditional evaluation methods gauge 
effectiveness “through the assessment of outcomes, often established a priori,” a technique 
criticized as oversimplified.138 Buhmann and Likely further recognized that the advent of 
social media has seen a shift “from survey research to social media and web monitoring 
and tracking.”139   
Macnamara and Gregory’s 2018 paper illuminates twenty “widely-discussed and 
promoted models,” concluding that none of them adequately account for stakeholder 
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interests.140 The omission of these interests from the models fails to capture the effects of 
emergent and participatory strategy discussed above. These omissions further symbolize 
the “one-way, top-down [,] organization-centric notion of strategy and communication that 
lingers in evaluation literature.”141 Even the acclaimed 2016 AMEC model, which 
incidentally discusses “social goals” such as “improved public health,” remains exclusively 
geared toward the top-down, goal-specific approach, in Macnamara and Gregory’s 
view.142 Nor did these twenty surveyed models suggest, much less require, analysis of 
unforeseen consequences, a key component of emergent strategy.143 Buhmann and 
Likely’s 2018 article points out that many models “downplay or even neglect the role of 
intervening variables,” focusing instead on a closed system evaluation that relies on the 
shaky assumption that communicators retain control over the system.144 
Currently, methods of evaluation remain a controversially-debated issue.145 
Macnamara identifies a current “deadlock” between M&E theorists and actual public 
relations and corporate communications practitioners.146 As early as 1979, Wright 
observed that “practitioners resist measurement of their work because they are ‘artists 
rather than managers.’”147 This resistance, which Buhmann and Likely call “stasis in 
practice,” persists today due to an unhelpful disconnect between academic research and 
actual application.148  
The stasis persists for a variety of reasons. Buhmann and Likely identified in 2018 
several “self-reported obstacles in the profession.” These include a narrow focus on 
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communication effectiveness rather than looking more broadly at the value of 
communications to an organization’s overall strategy, as well as confusing terminology 
and lack of standards.149 In practice, evaluation suffers from a “fixat [ion] on performance 
and objectivity to stabilize a particular ideology” without being a “functional element of a 
rational management process.”150 Were communications an actual functioning element, 
then communications inputs and outputs would play a significant role in management 
decision-making, rather than being something that occurs after critical decisions are 
already made. This improper fixation results in evaluation for its own sake rather than 
accomplishing anything that the organization can rationally define as strategy. Writing in 
the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Hoover concludes that, after all, an “agency must have 
a strategy to begin with, and incorporate [strategic communications] into the policy 
development process, not think of it as an afterthought.”151 
Years of modeling by academics and professionals have not resulted in the 
development of useful or detailed evaluation approaches.152 Other identified obstacles 
include a lack of interrelatedness between literature from different fields in the strategic 
communications domain and a “lack of diversity and interdisciplinary focus.”153 Most 
practitioners and academics alike often continue to employ a myopic view, using “seat of 
the pants” methods for evaluation.154 Hoover confirms in the realm of law enforcement 
that such approaches “lack strategy but it can undermine an organization’s long-term 
goals.”155 
A short-sighted approach to evaluation does not do justice to the potential of an 
organization’s strategic communications. Buhmann and Likely note this myopia results in 
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a lack of focus on “situational problems that feed into the communication strategy” rather 
than on the overall value added by the communication itself, such as how successful 
communications based on key strengths can actually drive the organization’s overall 
performance.156 In other words, situational problems present a distraction to assessing 
whether strategic communications add overall value, resulting in gaps in understanding an 
organization’s strategic capabilities.157  
Buhmann and Likely additionally warn that models based on positivist 
epistemology are naive, meaning that “models tend to be taken for granted as true 
representations of reality” only if such models claim to be based upon observable empirical 
evidence. But since these models ostensibly describe “subjective human experience and 
interpretation, which elude quantitative observation,” the researcher should employ 
“healthy skepticism” of such naive perspectives.158 Macnamara agrees that M&E activities 
based on “arbitrary scales and ratings” are inadequate to capture subjective, humanistic 
phenomena.159 Perhaps this strict development of theory from academia, in contrast with 
the all-too-common use of “seat of the pants” methods by communications managers and 
other practitioners, explains the persistent wide gap between the two camps.160 With these 
gaps and deficiencies in mind, the following section explores the possibilities of new model 
development to address these concerns. 
B. LITERATURE ON DEVELOPING NEW MODELS FOR 
EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
It should be clear from the above section that the field of strategic communications, 
such as it is, is not well served by existing models.161 If existing models do not work, the 
question arises whether the researcher or practitioner can or should develop a new model 
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to address his or her research needs. Macnamara believes that improvements in evaluation 
can increase customer-centricity, citizen participation, and lead to better policymaking for 
government.162 He proposes better evaluation is more ethical and is “increasingly expected 
and demanded by stakeholders and publics.”163 This focus on ethics of evaluation is rooted 
in “the view that organizations have an obligation to stakeholders and society . . . arising 
from corporate social responsibility and maintaining a ‘licence to operate.’”164 These 
stakeholder expectations likely hold true even where stakeholders know nothing about 
communications theory, yet they still demand consistent and participatory messaging from 
their leaders to support various public policies. 
1. Efforts to Identity the Audience(s) 
Authors of modeling literature such as Falkheimer and Heide suggest that a model 
should account for the fact that in the social media age, “communication professionals have 
never been able to define with any certainty who is part of a public, and have almost never 
been able to influence them to do what the organization wishes.”165 This blurring of the 
lines and modernization of communications would ideally be accounted for in future model 
development.166 Falkheimer and Heide warn that concepts from earlier models such as 
“transmitter, target groups, and beneficiaries” are no longer useful due to the illusory nature 
of control of communications.167 Any model of strategic communications using these 
terms is arguably obsolete, in their view. Likewise, any extant internal evaluation processes 
at government agencies that include these definitive elements of control over 
communications might be considered suspect. More stakeholder-centric evaluation 
processes would better account for the shifty nature of defining and influencing specific 
stakeholders. As the Defense Science Board Task Force points out, today’s “new 
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environment” means that “the ‘change state’ is the constant state in politics and business 
today.”168 
The realist evaluation perspective, developed by Pawson and Tilley, says the key 
question in evaluation should be “what works in which circumstances and for whom?”169 
This question, although relativistic, is not unlike Rumelt’s quite simple formulation of 
Good Strategy. Pawson and Tilley are essentially describing the key strengths operating 
during important pivot points. Of interest to the emergent strategy camp, realist evaluation 
specifically adds “attention to stakeholders and social context” as part of the inquiry into 
“what works in which circumstances.”170 
2. Examining Existing Evaluation Models 
The 2014 and 2018 articles by Macnamara and Buhmann and Likely, respectively, 
include their formulations of updated models of strategic communication evaluation, 
although both are quite generic and high level.171 The 2014 model adds mid-cycle 
feedback, which Macnamara calls “insights,” which should provide “inferences, 
predictions, suggestions and recommendations” before final evaluation.172 This addition 
appears to be reasonable, as such a “forward-looking approach,” at least for the latter stages 
of the communications cycle, avoids the possibility that later communications issued 
during the evaluation process may be “seen as post hoc rationalization.173 In other words, 
paying attention to the external effects of communications output during the entire 
communication process prevents the possibility of a mad rush at the end of a campaign to 
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attempt a pivot in messaging. Macnamara and Gregory’s 2018 paper continues to assert 
that a valid implementation of evaluation will “provide feedforward information, not only 
feedback.”174 Such “learning and insights . . . can inform future strategic planning.”175 In 
summary, paying attention to these insights along the way and communicating accordingly 
is preferable to implementing complex policy first and communicating about those policies 
as an afterthought.  
3. Ideal Attributes of a New or Improved Model 
In response to many years of criticisms of a lack of focus on stakeholder and 
societal impact, any updated model would ideally include effects on these areas as key 
components.176 In Macnamara and Gregory’s view, a useful model should balance the 
agency’s objectives “with the needs, expectations [,] and interests of stakeholders, publics, 
and society.”177 In her 2012 text about DHS, Thomas affirms that DHS’s attempts at 
strategic communications must involve stakeholders to “better understand the needs and 
concerns of its constituents.”178 The Defense Science Board Task Force agrees that 
successful communicators will have “in-depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that 
motivate human behavior.”179 The Task Force further notes that attempts to reach an 
audience must “begin by listening to that audience.”180 None of the models discussed 
above, however, mention listening as a starting point.  
Finally, Hon’s 1997 anecdotal research identifies several indicators of 
communications effectiveness, such as changing attitudes, affecting legislation, defusing 
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opponents, and others.181 However, these factors are largely descriptive of the effects of 
policy on stakeholders and publics, rather than assisting the project of measuring and 
evaluating the communications themselves. 
Not to ignore the Dark Side of strategic communications, a new or modified model 
of evaluation might incorporate the reality of information asymmetry and assess whether 
such asymmetry is desired or not, including varying degrees of asymmetry between 
multiple publics and the sender.182 In other words, is it advantageous for an agency to 
communicate more information to one stakeholder than to another and to allow this 
asymmetry to persist?  
Related to the Dark Side is the issue of timing. An agency that attempts to employ 
strategic silence runs the risk that an adversary will have the opportunity to discover 
adverse information about the agency’s operations and gain the chance to frame the issues 
first for the public and stakeholders.183 Being the first out of the gate provides a significant 
strategic advantage. Further, it provides the opportunity for what Stephens et al., in their 
Toolkit for Police Executives, describe as “the ‘inoculation’ effect.”184 This refers to the 
release of information to a party in advance of a confrontational situation so that the 
information cannot be used against the releasor in the future.185 This is essentially a 
positive, advance use of straw man arguments so that those arguments are already defeated 
if an adversary wishes to raise them in the future.  
Ambiguous language plays a role in intended communications strategy as well. 
Dulek and Campbell believe building in “ambiguity is critical when organizations state 
goals that concern their publics in order to allow the freedom to adapt to change in the 
future,” and this preserves deniability should it be needed.186 A reluctant practitioner 
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uncomfortable with the concept of deniability could just as easily frame this resource as 
flexibility. According to Dulek and Campbell, successful incorporation of these aspects of 
the Dark Side of strategic communications “bring [s] that dark side into the light.”187 
Above all else, a model should not be naive and must “include the dark side and explain 
how, when, and under what conditions this dark side [legitimately] emerges.”188 To do 
otherwise means that a model only captures half of reality. Finally, King’s research on 
emergent strategic communications indicates that a model should include the influences of 
emotion on the part of sender and recipient. In her view, the implied absence of emotion is 
a “faulty omission in both planned and emergent strategies.”189  
Keeping in mind Rumelt’s criticisms of the strategy industry in general, a new 
model could incorporate some form of checks and balances to ensure that his guidance on 
strategy formulation is followed.190 Since “bad strategy is more than the absence of good 
strategy,” the communicator must be cautious not to make affirmative mistakes in this 
area.191 A useful sanity check is whether the design of strategy is coherent and 
straightforward or is a set of multiple unconnected objectives with little to do with each 
other.192 Incorporating this wisdom about strategy in general could improve the reliability 
and usefulness of a model. 
Finally, the literature on information end-states is useful for establishing the 
benefits of considering where the desired ending point is for any attempt at strategic 
communications. Paul recommends that strategic planners consider the “end-state” of a 
given proposed policy in the public view, along with considering what the results of the 
policy may be.193 Paul notes that identifying information end-states in advance helps make 
real progress in strategic communication since it forces decision-makers “to consider the 
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information environment and communication consequences” all the way down the chain 
of command.194 In other words, Paul is effectively playing chess and attempting to imagine 
the game many moves ahead. With these characteristics of an ideal evaluation model in 
mind, the following section surveys existing models and their limitations discovered during 
this thesis research.  
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING MODELS IN THEIR APPLICATION 
TO EVALUATING SPECIFIC DHS COMMUNICATIONS 
All models are wrong, but some are useful. 
—George Box, “Robustness in the Strategy of Scientific Model Building” 
This discussion now examines existing models of measurement and evaluation of 
strategic communications and reviews several possible models for evaluation of the case 
studies in this thesis. An exhaustive compilation of all models is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, while a thorough survey can be found in Macnamara and Gregory’s 2018 article and 
Macnamara’s 2018 book Evaluating Public Communication.195 Their surveys discuss 
models from the late 1800s through 2018.196  
None of the models described in the 2018 article and book are satisfactory for the 
analysis required in this thesis. The models are generic and high level and do not offer 
enough granularity or specificity to analyze specific instances of DHS’s strategic 
communications. Thus, the models do not have the factors and characteristics consistent 
with the preceding discussion and “wish list” of what an ideal model for analysis of DHS’s 
strategic communications might contain.  
Any discussion of the merits of models should be done critically if “all models are 
wrong.”197 For example, arguably the most sophisticated and all-encompassing model is 
 
194 Paul, Strategic Communication Origins, 177. 
195 Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation”; Jim Macnamara, Evaluating Public 
Communication: Exploring New Models, Standards, and Best Practice (London: Routledge, 2018). 
196 Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation”; Macnamara, Evaluating Public 
Communication, 73. 
197 Macnamara, Evaluating Public Communication, 72. 
41 
Macnamara’s 2018 “integrated model of communication evaluation.”198 This model 
purports to capture the entire communication evaluation process for an organization, 
including inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact.199 Within each section, the 
model contains factors and activities relevant to each piece of the evaluation process, along 
with suggested evaluation methods. As this thesis focuses on evaluating communications 
output, the section of Macnamara’s 2018 model pertaining to output is most relevant for 
the present discussion. The output section of his model is excerpted in Figure 1.200 The 
model, however, takes a 30,000-foot view of the process and is less useful for practitioners 
conducting post hoc assessments of specific examples of communications.201  
 
Figure 1. Outputs Section of Jim Macnamara’s Integrated Model 
of Communication Evaluation202 
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Since specific assessment of actual real-world communications is the goal of  
this thesis, a more detailed and granular model is needed to focus on communications 
output. Thus, it is necessary to employ a model that “zeroes in” on the output piece  
of the communications evaluation process. A search of the available literature, specifically 
with law enforcement agency communications in mind, does not reveal any existing 
models suited for this purpose. A new model is thus introduced to accomplish the goals of 
this thesis. 
Development of a new model serves several worthwhile purposes. Primarily, it is 
useful for analyzing the specific communications at issue in the two case studies discussed 
in this thesis. Second, it may be of future use for practitioners or researchers seeking to 
analyze communications output of a law enforcement agency. Third, development of a new 
model allows for the inclusion of important concepts from the literature previously 
discussed in this thesis that are not accounted for in Macnamara’s 2018 model. These 
concepts include Good versus Bad Strategy, information fratricide, participatory and 
emergent strategy, timing of messaging, the Dark Side of communications, and other 
relevant topics.203 
D. INTRODUCING A MODEL OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
OUTPUT EVALUATION THAT CAN BE APPLIED TO DHS 
This section introduces a new model for further analysis of the communications 
output at issue in the two case studies, entitled the Stakeholder-Centric Communications 
Output Evaluation Model for Government (subsequently referred to as “the model”). It is 
based on the literature discussed previously and existing generic models. As indicated in 
the title, it focuses on stakeholders and publics as both informing the communications 
strategy and being the recipient of communications output. The model contains general 
sections for the strategy, messaging, and language of an organization’s desired or emergent 
communications output, which roughly correspond to an agency’s strategic, tactical, and 
operational communications decisions.  
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The model follows the “Activities” section of extant models such as Macnamara’s 
2018 model presented above. The model ends with the “Outcomes” section of the same 
model. Thus, the model can be viewed as a zoomed-in, more granular look at the “Output” 
section of extant models, with a specific focus and applicability toward law enforcement 
agencies such as DHS. The model is presented in Figure 2, and the following explanation 
discusses each part in turn. 
 
Figure 2. Stakeholder-Centric Communications Output Evaluation Model 
for Government 
1. General Format 
As informed by the literature and Macnamara’s survey of extant models, this model 
is constructed in the general format of a logic input-output model, with progressive flows 
of information and action depicted by one-way or bidirectional arrows. The model 
generally progresses temporally from left to right, with the top box (Stakeholders) 
depicting flows of information or action that can enter the communications process at 
various stages. Consistent with Macnamara’s 2014 and later models, the new model 
includes mid-cycle feedback, which he calls “insights.” These insights, also known as 
outtakes in the literature, provide “inferences, predictions, suggestions and 
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recommendations” before final evaluation.204 These insights serve as a feedback loop and 
avoid the possibility that later communications issued during the evaluation process may 
be “seen as post hoc rationalization.”205 
2. Stakeholders 
Recent literature contains the criticism that none of the extant models adequately 
refer to the interests of stakeholders and publics vis-à-vis the organization, a remnant of 
prior top-down understandings of the nature of organizational communications.206 Here, 
the output evaluation model begins with stakeholder interests. In particular, listening prior 
to messaging is a significant initial component of the process. This inclusion is consistent 
with warnings by the Defense Science Board Task Force that attempts to reach an audience 
must “begin by listening to that audience.”207 As discussed earlier, none of the models 
presented in the literature specify listening as a starting point. Thus, this is a novel 
introduction.  
The stakeholders section contains additional key factors such as identifying the 
stakeholders/publics, consideration of subjective human experience and emotion, and 
consideration whether information asymmetry between recipient audiences is desired or 
undesired. The first factor represents a recognition that multiple “target” audiences (to use 
an outmoded term), both known and unknown, typically exist. It is prudent to identify them 
and, if necessary, to distinguish their interests. The consideration of subjective human 
experience and emotion heeds King’s criticism that the implied absence of emotion is a 
“faulty omission in [models of] both planned and emergent strategies.”208 It thus follows 
that models of communication evaluation should include this factor. Finally, consideration 
of whether information asymmetry between recipient audiences is desired or undesired is 
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related to the recognition that multiple stakeholders exist and avoids the naivete found in 
simplistic, one-audience models. 
3. Strategy 
The strategy section of the model highlights the importance of the various types of 
strategy which guide government communications with the public. An organization’s 
primary focus is likely on its own planned strategy, which hopefully is consistent with 
Rumelt’s teachings that the hallmark of Good Strategy includes a focus “on one, or a very 
few, pivotal objectives” rather than a laundry list of lofty goals.209 Since simplicity is an 
elemental feature of Good Strategy, it is also listed in this section of the model. 
Next, this section considers the effects of participatory and emergent strategies as 
necessary parts of the evaluation process. This inclusion recognizes Falkheimer and 
Heide’s view that due to wide stakeholder engagement, future “strategic communications 
between organizations and stakeholders will be less relevant to the larger question of how 
common meaning is created.”210 The addition of emergent strategy heeds King’s point that  
“emergent strategies may be taken as deliberate by the audience, regardless of whether the 
strategy was planned for or not.”211 For this reason, any evaluation of communications 
should include consideration of the effects of emergent strategies. 
4. Messaging 
The messaging section of the model considers tactical-level decision-making on 
coordination of messaging, avoiding information fratricide, timing of messaging, and other 
related items. First, the need for avoidance of information fratricide is practically self-
evident. As noted in Chapter I, an organization cannot be maximally effective in 
communicating its policies if its leaders undercut each other with conflicting, inconsistent 
information. Timing of messaging is important to whether any strategic advantage accrues 
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from being first to release information rather than engaging in strategic silence.212 Timing 
is also related to advantages of the inoculation effect described by Stephens et al. in Toolkit 
for Police Executives.213  
Inclusion of the Dark Side contemplates the possibility that an organization might 
find it advantageous to release inaccurate, conflicting, incomplete, or otherwise unsavory 
(should it become known) information as a matter of strategy. While a discussion of the 
ethics of such practices is left to future researchers, it is prudent for the model to 
acknowledge that such practices may exist and to consider their effects. This 
acknowledgment heeds Dulek and Campbell’s admonition that above all else, a model must 
not be naive and must “include the dark side and explain how, when, and under what 
conditions this dark side emerges.”214 
Finally, consideration of the desired information end-state may be valuable as a 
matter of choice of messaging. The desired end-state affects choices related to each of the 
factors described above. Paul notes that identifying information end-states is helpful to 
making real progress in strategic communication since it forces decision-makers “to 
consider the information environment and communication consequences” all the way down 
the chain of command.215 Thus, it follows that an evaluation of communications should 
consider whether such consideration has occurred. 
5. Language 
The final section of the model, language, represents the operational-level decisions 
made in formulating actual messaging and putting specific words to paper. Of course, such 
ground-level decisions can only occur once an organization’s overall communications 
strategy and messaging issues have been considered. This section considers such issues as 
tone of messaging and consideration of the identities of the various audiences and publics 
so that messaging can be tailored to these audiences. The two related topics of degree of 
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disclosure and use of ambiguity represent the operational-level implementation of message 
timing, desired information asymmetry, and possibly, resort to the Dark Side of 
communications. Evaluation of these factors against the achieved outcome may provide 
insight to an organization about the effectiveness of its communications. 
E. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In summary, this chapter asked how to gauge the effectiveness of governmental 
communications and where to find or how to create a valid and reliable model or measure. 
While recognizing that methods of evaluation remain a controversially debated issue, the 
chapter reviewed a variety of features and issues identified in the literature for potential 
inclusion in a new model. The chapter introduced a new model called the Stakeholder-
Centric Communications Output Evaluation Model for Government. 
While this newly developed model may be of broader applicability in explaining 
the output section of more high-level models (such as Macnamara’s 2018 model), it was 
developed with the specific research question and case studies of this thesis in mind. Any 
wider application must be made critically and consistently with published literature cited 
in this thesis. Further, the model does not capture the nuances of communication via 
Twitter or other social media and any differences between those social-media-based 
communications vis-à-vis more traditional communications. Due to these potential 
differences, the model does not address such social media communications. As previously 
noted, such communications (primarily President Trump’s tweets) were excluded from 
analysis.216 Further research is needed into the evaluation of output via those media.217  
The following two chapters introduce and discuss the two case studies and provide 
specific examples of communications by DHS and governmental officials for later 
evaluation using the model developed in this chapter.  
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III. CASE STUDY ONE: 
THE PARENT-CHILD SEPARATION POLICY 
The United States has no policy of separating migrant families at the border. 
There is such a policy, but it’s all the Democrats’ fault. The policy was a 
“simple decision,” but one “nobody likes.” The policy is good, legal, and 
Jesus would approve. 
—Scott Bixby, The Daily Beast218 
A. A TALE OF TWO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY 
ROLLOUTS, AND WHAT DHS SAID ABOUT THEM 
The following two chapters discuss two examples of significant policy rollouts 
during the Trump Administration related to immigration and border enforcement. These 
policies garnered significant public attention and numerous examples exist of 
communications by DHS and other high-level government employees. These policies are 
the parent-child separation policy, also known as the zero tolerance policy, which was 
officially in place from May 2018 to June 2018.219 The second policy is the Migrant 
Protection Protocols (MPP) which was in place between January 2019 and March 2020.220 
Both of these policies present an opportunity for studying DHS’s style of strategic 
communications due to the variety of communications issued by high-ranking government 
officials on these controversial policies.  
Each chapter briefly provides a timeline for both policies and discusses in depth 
various communications from key officials of the Departments of Homeland Security and 
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Justice (DHS and DOJ, respectively). The discussion identifies trends in these 
communications and attempts to categorize them accordingly. As noted throughout this 
thesis, the goal is not to analyze the merits, successes, or failures of the operational policies 
themselves; such an analysis is outside the scope of this thesis and is left to future writers 
and researchers. Rather, the purpose of these case study chapters is to identify, categorize, 
and summarize the wide-ranging communications that emanated from key administration 
officials during the height of each policy. As used here, “key administration officials” 
refers to high-ranking individuals, typically political appointees, such as the secretary of 
DHS, senior leadership of ICE and CBP, the Attorney General, and White House officials 
such as the White House press secretary.221 Where these officials’ statements diverge  
from other positions taken by lower-ranking officials, particularly during the parent-child 
separation policy, the case study chapters highlight those inconsistences and mixed 
messaging. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO THE PARENT-CHILD SEPARATION POLICY 
The parent-child separation policy, also known as the zero-tolerance policy, 
consisted of near-total enforcement of laws regarding illegal border crossings. Such 
enforcement occurred even against individuals who were part of so-called family units, 
which resulted in the separation of thousands of children from their parents upon 
apprehension by DHS.222 Family units consist of a male or female head of household  
(or both) accompanied by one or more minor children.223 Border crossing violations are 
commonly referred to as “§ 1325 violations,” based on the section of federal criminal law 
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that is most often violated, 18 U.S.C. § 1325.224  This statute prohibits entry into  
“the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers, . . . 
elud[ing] examination or inspection by immigration officers, or . . . [entering] by a willfully 
false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact.”225   
Before the child separation policy, enforcement of this statute against adult 
individuals entering with children was relatively rare.226 Because enforcement of this 
criminal statute requires a criminal arrest of the violator and transfer to U.S. Marshals 
custody, arrangements must be made for the placement of any minor child or children 
accompanying the violator. Such children would necessarily be separated from the adult 
head of household for the criminal arrest to occur.227 These custody arrangements could 
consist of placing the child with a family member, if possible, or placing the child in the 
custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), part of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS).228 ORR is the government agency charged with 
maintaining custody of unaccompanied alien children, whether such children cross the 
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border unaccompanied or become unaccompanied due to the criminal arrest of their parent, 
as typically occurred during the parent-child separation policy.229 Therefore, any policy 
requiring zero tolerance of border crossing violations significantly increased enforcement 
of § 1325 violations against family unit heads of households and necessarily resulted in 
greater numbers of parent-child separations. For context, “about 54,000 children and their 
guardians were apprehended [during the four months] between Oct. 1, 2016, and Jan. 31, 
2017, more than double the number caught over the same time period a year earlier.”230 
Unlike the second case study in this chapter, the Migrant Protection Protocols, 
which had well-defined start and end dates, assigning a precise beginning and end date to 
the parent-child separation policy is more elusive. While it is clear that the majority “of 
child separations at the southern border occurred between April and June 2018,” evidence 
indicates that the policy actually began before April and continued after June.231 DOJ 
formally began its “zero tolerance policy” in April 2018.232 Court-ordered efforts to 
identify separated children resulted in DHS identifying 2,816 children who were covered 
by the Ms. L class-action lawsuit, one of the major litigation cases resulting from the 
separation policy.233 After this litigation and the resulting court orders, “Acting Homeland 
Security secretary Kevin McAleenan has said that family separations remain 
‘extraordinarily rare’ and happen only when the adults pose a risk to the child because of 
their criminal record, a communicable disease, abuse or neglect,” and that such separations 
are now “carefully governed by policy and by court order.”234 Figure 3 depicts a timeline 
of the zero tolerance policy generated by the DHS Office of Inspector General. 
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Figure 3. Timeline of Zero Tolerance Policy235 
Subsequent audits by both the “DHS Office of Inspector General [OIG] and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Trump Administration conducted 
these separations with no plans to track separated children [and] made false statements 
about the ability to track these children and reunite families.”236 In contrast to the figures 
noted above that were provided during the Ms. L litigation, the OIG investigation noted 
that CBP reportedly separated 3,014 children from their parents during the zero tolerance 
policy.237 
C. OFFICIAL MESSAGING ON THE PARENT-CHILD SEPARATION 
POLICY 
The following discussion provides a topical and thematic overview of the various 
public statements made in speeches, press releases, and other official documents and 
statements issued by DHS concerning the various phases of the parent-child separation 
policy.238 This approach to these communications is most appropriate for this case study, 
which contains multiple points of inconsistencies and problematic issues which are best 
organized and presented thematically.  
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1. Various Policy Justifications Are Given for the Policy 
As early as two months into the Trump administration, in March 2017, DHS 
Secretary John Kelly was asked about “separat [ing] the children from their moms and 
dads,” to which he responded, “Yes, I am considering, in order to deter more movement 
along this terribly dangerous [smuggling/trafficking] network, I am considering exactly 
that.”239 Kelly also stated during this time “that he ‘would do almost anything to deter’ 
Central American migration, including separating children from their parents and placing 
them in detention facilities or foster care.”240  
a. Justification 1: The Policy Protects Against Child Endangerment 
Thus, as early as March 2017, a DHS official had publicly stated a purpose of 
possible separations would be to generate a deterrent effect.241 Interestingly, a March 2017 
Reuters article discussing this possibility quoted only “three [unnamed] government 
officials.”242 It is unclear from the article if these officials were speaking with 
authorization and if this use of anonymity to deliver a policy announcement was intentional 
on the part of DHS. Kelly later tried to walk these early comments back during his April 
2017 Senate testimony, stating that separations might occur “only if the situation at that 
point in time requires it . . . [n]ot routinely,” and only “if [Kelly] thought the child was 
endangered.”243  
In other reporting, Kelly claimed “separations would occur only in extenuating 
circumstances such as an illness.”244 Kelly did not further describe what situations 
involving “illness” might justify separation, although there is media reporting of one 
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example of three sisters being separated from a parent due to the parent’s HIV positive 
status.245 A CBP spokesman later acknowledged that although “HIV is not considered a 
communicable disease that would bar entry into the U.S., nor is it grounds for family 
separation,” the medical condition might nonetheless justify separation given “additional 
considerations,” such as “the ‘potential requirement for hospitalization’ and the best 
interest of the child.”246   
b. Justification 2: The Policy Deters the Exploitation of Children 
As a somewhat different rationale, “a senior DHS official had previously told CNN 
that the department was considering a proposal to separate children from adults [which 
was] meant to deter the exploitation of children.”247 Another spokesman claimed the 
agency wanted to “discourage [migrants] from even beginning the journey.”248 Even in 
these early days of the policy, where there might have been general agreement about the 
policy as a deterrent, there was ambiguity about exactly what was to be deterred. 
These early statements are in direct contrast to later statements by DHS Secretary 
Kirstjen Nielsen denying the zero tolerance policy’s intended deterrent effect. She stated it 
was “offensive” to suggest that the policy was “intend [ed] to send a message” to would-
be border crossers.249 However, she did not explain why the use of prosecutions as a 
deterrent would be offensive or controversial in her view (especially if it was to deter child 
exploitation, as previously suggested). At a June 2018 briefing, Nielsen declined to answer 
questions attempting to contrast her claim that zero tolerance was not intended as a 
deterrent with prior statements of Attorney General Jeff Sessions indicating that it was a 
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clear deterrent.”250 As for official press releases on the rationale for zero tolerance, DHS 
posted a “Frequently Asked Questions: Zero Tolerance Immigration Prosecutions” 
document in June 2018.251 This document justified separations that occur where “DHS 
cannot ascertain the parental relationship, when DHS determines that a child may be at risk 
with the presumed parent or legal guardian, or if a parent or legal guardian is referred for 
criminal prosecution, including for illegal entry.”252 Related to this justification, Attorney 
General Sessions noted that “if you are smuggling a child, then we will prosecute you and 
that child will be separated from you as required by law. . . . If you don’t like that, then 
don’t smuggle children over our border.”253 
c. Justification 3: The Policy Deters Unlawful Border Crossing 
Joining Kelly’s camp and undermining Nielsen’s position was Attorney General 
Sessions: “when asked if the child separations policy was intended as a deterrent, [he] said, 
‘yes, hopefully people will get the message and come through the border at the port of entry 
and not break across the border unlawfully.’”254 By May 2018, White House Chief of Staff 
John Kelly again relied on deterrence as a justification for zero tolerance, claiming “‘a big 
name of the game is deterrence.’ . . . [a]nd separating families ‘could be a tough 
deterrent.’”255  
 
250 Sarah Sanders and Kirstjen Nielsen, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders and 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen,” American Presidency Project, June 18, 
2018, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/press-briefing-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-and-
department-homeland-security-secretary. 
251 “Frequently Asked Questions: Zero Tolerance Immigration Prosecutions,” Department of 
Homeland Security, June 15, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/15/frequently-asked-questions-
zero-tolerance-immigration-prosecutions. 
252 Department of Homeland Security. 
253 Hegarty, “Timeline: Immigrant Children Separated”; Jonathan Blitzer, “How the Trump 
Administration Got Comfortable Separating Immigrant Kids from Their Parents,” New Yorker, May 30, 
2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-trump-administration-got-comfortable-
separating-immigrant-kids-from-their-parents; Pete Williams, “Sessions: Parents, Children Entering U.S. 
Illegally Will Be Separated,” NBC News, May 7, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-
department/sessions-parents-children-entering-us-illegally-will-be-separated-n872081. 
254 “House Oversight Report,” 12. 
255 Blitzer, “How Trump Got Comfortable.” 
57 
Kelly went on to make remarks about the demographics of migrants recently 
attempting to enter the United States. For example, Kelly stated, “overwhelmingly rural 
people in the countries they come from – fourth, fifth, sixth grade educations are kind of 
the norm. They don’t speak English, obviously that’s a big thing . . . [t]hey don’t integrate 
well, they don’t have skills. They’re not bad people. They’re coming here for a reason. And 
I sympathize with the reason.”256 
 Statements by Attorney General Sessions, who had “long advocated extremely 
aggressive efforts to prevent illegal entry into the country and crack down on 
undocumented immigrants already here,” likewise continued the justification of deterring 
illegal migration.257 In an October 2017 speech, he claimed that President Trump was 
“going to fix” the “loopholes” that result in “many of these people simply disappear [ing]” 
into the United States after apprehension by DHS.258 By May 2018, Sessions made plain 
that “every adult who crosses the southwest border illegally [would be prosecuted,] 
acknowledg [ing] this will require the government to separate children from the adults 
traveling with them.” While he claimed to have “‘no doubt’ people illegally crossing the 
border are fleeing danger or despair . . . he pointed out that ‘[w]e cannot take everyone on 
this planet who is in a difficult situation.’”259 In comparing the population of illegal aliens 
in the United States with the population of the state of Georgia, Sessions remarked, “We’re 
not going to stand for this. We are not going to let this country be invaded. We will not be 
stampeded. We will not capitulate to lawlessness.”260 
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 By June 2018, Sessions invoked the Apostle Paul’s “clear and wise command in 
Romans 13, to obey the laws of the government because God has ordained them for the 
purpose of order . . . [because o]rderly and lawful processes are good in themselves and 
protect the weak and lawful.”261 In the same speech given to church leaders, he criticized 
stakeholders who were adversarial to his policy preferences, such as the “open borders, 
pro-amnesty crowd,” the “open borders radicals and well-paid lobbyists,” and the “elites 
and the Washington insiders.”262 
d. Justification 4: The Policy is Similar to Other Criminal-Arrest-Related 
Family Separations 
 Other justifications for the policy included analogies to family separations which 
may occur if an adult is arrested for a non-immigration-related crime in the United States. 
This was an apparent attempt to equate administrative immigration arrests or minor 
immigration-related criminal arrests with arrests for more serious offenses, the 
criminalization of which is less controversial.263 For example, White House Press 
Secretary Sarah Sanders noted in June 2018 the “number of individuals that are 
permanently separated from their families due to the illegal aliens that have come across 
this border and murdered and killed American citizens.”264  
 Other speakers described the separation policy under Trump as “‘continu [ing] a 
long-standing policy by the previous administration,’ . . . listing risk to the child and 
criminal prosecution of the parent as among the reasons for separation.”265 While this 
statement appears to be generally accurate in terms of the fact that such separations did 
occur under the prior administration, it’s unclear to what extent since the Trump 
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administration “declined to provide month-by-month figures” from before and after 
Trump’s inauguration.266  
e. Justification 5: The New Policy Is Consistent with Long-Standing Policy 
 At a June 2018 press briefing with Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, Secretary Nielsen 
offered to correct “a lot of misinformation about what DHS is and is not doing as it relates 
to families at the border.”267 Nielsen reiterated her perspective that “this administration 
did not create a policy of separating families at the border,” and again repeated the claim 
that “we have a long-existing policy. Multiple administrations have followed that outline 
when we may take action to protect children. We will separate those who claim to be a 
parent and child if we cannot determine a familial or custodial relationship exists.”268  
 Similar to Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s comments discussed below, Nielsen 
acknowledged that “we no longer exempt entire classes of people who break the law. 
Everyone is subject to prosecution.”269 Nielsen made clear that “parents who entered 
illegally are, by definition, criminals. Illegal entry is a crime as determined by Congress,” 
using language that is technically accurate but may not appeal to or resonate with all 
stakeholders.270 Nielsen pointed the finger at Congress, claiming “it is the beginning of 
the unraveling of democracy when the body who makes the laws, instead of changing them, 
tells the enforcement body not to enforce the law.”271 Her statement did not explicitly state 
who within Congress had asked DHS not to enforce the law, although it previously referred 
to prior testimony she had given to Congress.272 
 When asked a series of questions about allegations of child abuse, unfavorable 
statements made by Laura Bush, and comparing the enforcement policy to Japanese 
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internment during World War II, Nielsen addressed a different issue each time, declined to 
comment on “hearsay stories,” and reiterated that Congress should act through the 
democratic process to favorably change the law.273 
Overall, these statements from DHS secretaries, the attorney general, and the White 
House chief of staff contained considerable variation about whether the zero tolerance 
policy was intended to have deterrent effects on general migration. 
2. DHS’s Silence as a Form of Communication 
As early as “July 2017, the [a]dministration began a secret pilot program to separate 
children and their parents arriving at the border in the El Paso sector,” resulting in the 
separation of 281 migrants.274 This pilot was not publicly announced in advance nor as it 
was rolled out. It only later came to light after it was well underway and stakeholders in El 
Paso “heard increasing numbers of migrants talk of their children being taken away — and 
having no idea where they were.”275 Officials later claimed that no separations occurred 
“prior to the April 2018 zero tolerance policy,” but such claims appear incorrect.276 Other 
reporting from June 2018 put the separation numbers “between October 2016 and February 
2018” at 1,768, although it was not reported how many of those occurred prior to the 
inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2017.277 
House committee investigations revealed another notable aspect to the claims that 
separations were a necessary result of referrals for criminal prosecution of parents, 
concluding that there had been a lack of candor on the part of the administration about the 
separation policy.278 For example, House committee data show that “some parents who 
were separated from their children were never sent to U.S. Marshals or other federal 
criminal custody, but instead went straight from CBP custody to ICE detention,” while 
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others only had a brief stint in criminal custody and were then returned to immigration 
custody.279 Available public statements from key officials do not mention this subset of 
parents subjected to the separation policy. It is unclear if these omissions were intentional 
or if such nuanced detail about the implementation of the policy was unknown to the 
officials. 
Finally, the House committee investigation report noted multiple instances in which 
bipartisan committee members had sought information from the administration in June and 
July 2018 regarding the separation policy.280 DHS and other agencies (DOJ and HHS) did 
not fully comply and produce the requested information for over six months.281 It is 
unclear from the committee report whether this was an intentional use of strategic silence 
by DHS or if some other internal rationale justified the non-responsiveness to these 
congressional stakeholders.  
3. Other Conflicts in Messaging 
A great deal of the inconsistent messaging from key officials related to whether the 
Trump administration had an official policy of parent-child separation or not. There is at 
least one example of a public meeting where officials had face-to-face communication with 
stakeholders about the policy rollout. In October 2017, over 20 “advocates, attorneys and 
faith leaders in El Paso sat down with government officials [from CBP, ICE, and DHS] for 
a meeting about immigration” at a meeting coordinated by the local House 
representative.282 Instead of messaging from or supported by high-ranking DHS officials, 
a local Border Patrol agent spoke for DHS and claimed, “the new policy is that we can 
separate children as long as they are 10 or over.”283 After the meeting, however, a local 
CBP attorney sent an email to the attendees representing that “the Border Patrol does not 
have a blanket policy requiring the separation of family units. . . . any increase in separated 
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family units is due primarily to the increase in prosecutions of immigration related 
crimes.”284  
These conflicting communications continued with a statement from an official CBP 
spokesman, in which it was reported that “prior to zero tolerance . . . CBP had no policy of 
separating families for reasons other than medical need, fraud or criminal cases, which 
could include criminal immigration violations.”285 The phrasing of this statement raises 
the question of what the policy was after zero tolerance was implemented, since the 
administration continued to rely on the need to prosecute criminal immigration violations 
during zero tolerance. Another related conflict arose with a prior statement from an 
“assistant Border Patrol chief . . . [that] said agents do not refer family units for criminal 
charges unless an adult has a prior conviction, claiming ‘[w]e don’t prosecute family 
units.’”286  
Later in 2017, a local CBP spokesman in El Paso commented on the alleged policy, 
stating it was a “matter of officials in Washington.” CBP then deferred to ORR for further 
questions, which deferred back to CBP.287 Thus, at least five different CBP officials were 
on record providing different and sometimes conflicting information about the nature of a 
separation policy, if one existed. 
Later statements in March 2018, in response to litigation, claimed that “DHS does 
not currently have a policy of separating women and children. However, we retain the 
authority to do so in certain circumstances—particularly to protect a child from potential 
smuggling and trafficking activities.”288 Advocates, however, claimed the enforcement 
policy was “tantamount to a de-facto policy of family separation.”289 Another DHS 
statement from March “ask [ed] that members of the public and media view advocacy 
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group claims that we are separating women and children for reasons other than to protect 
the child with the level of skepticism they deserve.”290 Tom Homan, ICE acting director, 
also went on record in May 2018 using the “no blanket policy” language, stating “DHS 
does not have a blanket policy on separating families as a deterrent. . . . There is no new 
policy. This has always been the policy,” although the reporting does not indicate whether 
he further explained exactly what has “always been the policy.”291  
Secretary Nielsen claimed on multiple occasions that “there was no policy to 
separate children from their parents.”292 In April 2018, Secretary Nielsen testified before 
a House committee, stating “that there is no policy that calls for the separation of families 
as a deterrence. ‘The standard is to—in every case—is to keep that family together as long 
as operationally possible . . . When we separate, we separate because the law tells us to, 
and that is in the interest of the child.’”293 In Senate testimony in May 2018, she stated, 
“We do not have a policy to separate children from their parents,” and a month later she 
tweeted, “We do not have a policy of separating families at the border. Period.”294 Instead, 
Nielsen claimed that the policy was simply that “everyone is subject to prosecution” for 
illegal border crossings, even if such increased prosecutions would result in “necessary” 
separations of families.295 Such statements conflict with other reported communications, 
such as the October 2017 statement from the El Paso Border Patrol agent claiming that “the 
new policy is that we can separate children as long as they are 10 or over.”296 Due in part 
to this mixed messaging about the nature of the policy, if one existed, Senate Democrats 
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later “asked the FBI to open a perjury investigation” into Nielsen’s testimony on this issue, 
based on documents later uncovered.297 
 In a reference to the credibility of reporting, Secretary Nielsen stated in June 2018 
regarding the care that minors receive in government custody that “it is important to note 
that these minors are very well taken care of. . . . Don’t believe the press. They are very 
well taken care of.”298 Nielsen made this statement following press accounts that a child 
housing “facility was understaffed and prison-like,” where “children were running away, 
screaming, throwing furniture and attempting suicide.”299 
 Overall, these speakers appear to have fundamental disagreement about what the 
official policy of the U.S. government was regarding parent-child separation, and this 
disagreement was widely apparent in the variety of messaging on this issue. Further, 
several examples exist of these officials attacking the media and public reports when 
challenged on aspects of the policy. The following section discusses other proffered 
justifications for parent-child separations during the use of the policy. 
4. June 2018 Policy Rollback 
By mid-June 2018, the policy had come under increasing public and media 
pressure, as well as threats from impending litigation.300 President Trump initially 
“claimed to be powerless to stop [the family separations], saying: ‘We can’t do it through 
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executive order,’” although he did not explain why not.301 Despite this statement, he 
nonetheless issued an Executive Order on June 20, 2018, which rolled back the policy to 
“maintain family unity.”302 As with later communications on MPP discussed in the next 
chapter, the Executive Order criticized the “unfortunate . . . Congress [ional] failure to act” 
on immigration reform and border issues as creating the need to separate parents from their 
children upon their illegal entry.303 The order was later criticized by immigration 
advocates as “not provid [ing] any guidance about how to reunify families who were 
forcibly separated under the policy. Similarly, it lacked guidance about the circumstances 
in which family separations might occur in the future.”304 In commenting on his issuing 
the order, President Trump stated he didn’t “like the sight or the feeling of families being 
separated.”305 White House Counselor Kellyanne Conway likewise said that “nobody likes 
seeing babies ripped from their mothers’ arms.”306 An anonymous White House aide noted 
that “at a certain point the reality of the optics and politics sets in,” as part of the reasoning 
for President Trump’s reversal of the policy.307  
D. PARENT-CHILD SEPARATION POLICY CONCLUSION 
 This policy has gone by several names: zero tolerance, parent-child separation, and 
family separation. Almost three years after the official end of the policy, it remains unclear 
what the precise motivations were for enacting the policy. Justifications included 
protecting children against endangerment or illness, deterring the exploitation of children, 
deterring unlawful border crossing, making analogies to other criminal arrest situations 
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where children are separated from arrestees, and noting the consistency with other long-
standing government policies. 
As described by Daily Beast reporter Scott Bixby, communications regarding the 
policy were a “public-relations pileup [,] just a facet of the botched rollout” of the 
policy.308 Each speaker who has publicly commented on the policy, whether high or low 
ranking in the administration, offered slightly different (and in some cases quite different) 
views on whether the policy was intended as a deterrent and whether the government had 
an official policy of parent-child separation at all. The nuances of these disparate examples 
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IV. CASE STUDY TWO: 
MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS 
The Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) is a program whereby illegal aliens 
encountered along or near the southern border are processed for removal proceedings and 
then returned to Mexico to await their hearing dates in immigration court. Hearings were 
held on the border at multiple “tent court” locations in San Ysidro, California; Calexico, 
California; Nogales, Arizona; El Paso, Texas; Eagle Pass, Texas; Laredo, Texas; and 
Brownsville, Texas.309 The first MPP immigration court hearings began in San Ysidro 
(south of San Diego) in late January 2019 and they continued until March 2020, the onset 
of the COVID-19 pandemic.310 The administration successfully defended the program 
against various legal challenges ultimately reaching the U.S. Supreme Court, which issued 
a ruling favorable to DHS.311 
On the morning of a scheduled MPP immigration court hearing, an alien would 
appear at a CBP-operated port of entry and CBP would transport the alien to the hearing 
site, what DHS called “soft-sided structures.”312 After each hearing, the alien was given a 
notice of the future hearing date and CBP transported him or her back to the port of entry 
and the alien was returned to Mexico.313 Participants in this program were housed in a 
variety of living arrangements on the Mexican side of the border, including federal and 
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private shelters and rented apartments.314 After the initial rollout in San Ysidro, additional 
MPP court sites were added incrementally to scale up the operations of the program all 
along the southern border. 
Despite the administration’s defense of the program in various litigation, MPP was 
not without its criticisms.315 Lack of access to U.S.-based counsel while in Mexico was a 
major criticism, along with claims that forcing MPP participants to remain in Mexico 
unnecessarily subjected them to risk of harm or violence while in Mexico.316 
A. DHS’S MESSAGING ON MPP 
The following discussion provides an overview of public statements made in 
speeches, press releases, and other official documents and statements issued by DHS 
concerning phases of the MPP program. Unlike the preceding discussion of the parent-
child separation policy for which a thematically organized presentation format was used, a 
chronological discussion of the communications for this case study is presented here given 
the more measured, methodical, and incremental manner in which DHS issued 
communications concerning MPP between late 2018 and early 2020. A summary of the 
major themes of the communications is found in the chapter conclusion. 
December 20, 2018: DHS announced that it would begin a program of requiring 
non-Mexican arrivals to return to Mexico, but such arrivals “may return to the United States 
as necessary and appropriate to attend their immigration court proceedings,” and a “joint 
effort” with Mexico to implement the program.317 
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In a statement on the same date, Secretary Nielsen began by framing the need for 
the policy as an “illegal immigration crisis.”318 Although the statement referred to the 
United States’ “humanitarian commitments,” the statement also employed stronger 
language such as “aliens trying to game the system” and disappear and “skip their court 
dates.”319 The statement further referred to replacing “‘catch and release’ . . . with ‘catch 
and return.’”320 The statement further used statistics to appeal to the audience, claiming 
that “the number of asylum claims soared 67 percent compared to the previous year [while 
m]ost of these claims are not meritorious.”321 
The last line of the statement indicates that “vulnerable populations will get the 
protection they need while they await a determination in Mexico” on any protection claims 
filed with the Mexican government.322 However, the statement lacks detail about what 
steps, if any, the U.S. government would take to guarantee such protection. 
January 24, 2019: DHS issued a press release about MPP several days in advance 
of the beginning of MPP hearings.323 The release opened with a quote from Secretary 
Nielsen framing the need for the program in the context of “the urgent humanitarian and 
security crisis at the Southern border” and the need to “end the exploitation of our generous 
immigration laws.”324 The release primarily referred to DHS’s law enforcement-related 
mission, while the first reference to immigrant stakeholder interests was several paragraphs 
into the statement, acknowledging the need to “ensur [e] that vulnerable populations 
receive the protections they need.”325  
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The release included numerous statistics concerning the numbers of arrivals of 
“illegal and inadmissible aliens . . . at the Southern border,” and changes in demographic 
trends of arrivals from “predominantly single adult males from Mexico” to “family units 
and unaccompanied children.”326 The release included language appealing to law and 
order interests and claimed the new policy “provide [s] a safer and more orderly process 
that will discourage individuals from attempting illegal entry and making false claims to 
stay in the U.S., and allow more resources to be dedicated to individuals who legitimately 
qualify for asylum.”327 
In a section of the press release dedicated to the issue of access to counsel, the 
release included two sentences about choosing counsel at the alien’s expense and a “list of 
legal services providers in the area which offer services at little or no expense to the 
migrant,” but the release did not address the question of how U.S.-based immigration 
attorneys would meet with and effectively represent clients housed out of the country in 
Mexico.328 The primary benefits of MPP touted in the release are “reduc [ing] the number 
of aliens taking advantage of U.S. law and discourag [ing] false asylum claims,” and 
preventing aliens from “disappear [ing] into the U.S. before a court issues a final decision” 
on their cases.329 
January 25, 2019: Secretary Nielsen issued guidance to the heads of CBP, ICE, 
and USCIS regarding the rollout of MPP, claiming that MPP participants would be 
afforded “all legal and procedural protection [s]” while residing in Mexico waiting for their 
MPP hearings.330 However, the memorandum did not specify how these protections were 
to be provided or indicate whether any stakeholders other than the government of Mexico 
had been involved with drafting the guidance or implementing the program.331 
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January 29, 2019: Secretary Nielsen addressed DHS law enforcement personnel 
at the San Ysidro MPP location.332 Her remarks indicated that she held her law 
enforcement audience in high regard, as she was “continually impressed with the daily 
success stories [she heard] from the exceptional men and women of ICE.”333 In referring 
to the participants in the MPP program, Nielsen noted that a primary goal was eliminating 
“chaotic migration flows” and “restoring the rule of law.”334 She again referred to 
“allowing DHS to focus resources on providing relief to individuals fleeing persecution,” 
without any details of any concrete steps which would help accomplish this goal.335 There 
is no indication in the release that any non-DHS stakeholders or immigration advocates 
were present at the event. 
April 1, 2019: By April, Secretary Nielsen claimed that “the crisis at our border is 
worsening,” as a reason to order the assignment of additional CBP personnel to the border 
and to increase the numbers of aliens returned daily to Mexico pursuant to MPP.336 For 
apparently the first time during the MPP program, Nielsen directly blamed Congress for 
its “fail [ure] to act yet again,” and threatened that “all options are on the table.”337  
April 7, 2019: A press release describing a visit to Calexico with members of 
Congress and President Trump described the “bold action being taken by DHS to address 
the dramatic influx of unaccompanied children and families,” language possibly intended 
to impart a great sense of urgency to the actions described in the communication.338 As 
with prior addresses during site tours, Secretary Nielsen used stakeholder-centric language 
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(“you have my undying respect and appreciation”) when interacting with law enforcement 
stakeholders such as CBP and ICE personnel, “the Arizona National Guard [,] and U.S. 
Marines,” yet there was no indication that other non-governmental stakeholders or 
immigration advocates were present at the address.339  
Nielsen again focused on Congress’s inaction, noting that “the only way to truly fix 
this crisis is with legislation. Outdated laws and misguided court decisions have created an 
illegal fast-pass into America.”340 In response to what she characterized as a “near system-
wide meltdown,” Nielsen pivoted into “taking a full-fledged ‘disaster response’ approach 
to the border emergency,” borrowing terminology from outside the traditional immigration 
enforcement arena and from the field of emergency management.341  
August 8, 2019: Shortly after the preceding site visit in April 2019, Secretary 
Nielsen resigned and was replaced by Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan, a prior CBP 
commissioner.342 At an Arizona press conference in August, Secretary McAleenan made 
his case for the effectiveness of the MPP program using improvements in border crossing 
metrics, arguing that the success of the program should be measured in terms of the 
decrease in apprehensions of illegal aliens of certain nationalities.343 The secretary’s 
comments did not initially include statistics about “providing access to protection to those 
who need it,” despite his acknowledgment of such protection as an objective of the overall 
enforcement plan.344 In response to a question later in the briefing, McAleenan touted a 
benefit to migrant stakeholders of faster court decisions in MPP than through traditional 
non-MPP immigration courts in the interior of the United States, and he also acknowledged 
the contributions of the government of Mexico, a key stakeholder and partner in the MPP 
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program.345 However, he commented negatively on the purported asylum claims of a large 
majority of asylum seekers, noting that the asylum process is “not a pathway to an 
economic migration or to choose what country you want to live in.”346 
Like his predecessor, McAleenan referred to the need for Congressional reform and 
support. Instead of outright blaming Congress for the crisis, he noted the need “to seek the 
targeted fixes to our immigration laws that we’ve been asking for from Congress.”347 He 
freely discussed overcrowding at various CBP facilities in response to a question, noting 
that the overcrowding situation “was very difficult to manage.”348  
September 17, 2019: In a reuse of deterrence-related language that proved 
troublesome during the parent-child separation policy, Secretary McAleenan visited the 
new MPP facility in Laredo, Texas, and claimed that ongoing operation of MPP “will deter 
people who don’t have valid asylum claims,” in contrast with other MPP justifications 
offered throughout the program.349 During the tour, Acting CBP Commissioner Mark 
Morgan deferred to Mexico as having “responsibility to provide security for migrants en 
route to their court hearings on the U.S. side.”350 He distanced DHS from obligations 
regarding security in Mexico by pointing out that the United States must take care not “to 
paint an entire nation as a war zone.” 351 Morgan cast doubt on reports of cartel violence 
against migrants, stating, “I don’t believe that. We are not receiving that information from 
the government of Mexico.”352  
September 23, 2019: A month later, Secretary McAleenan addressed the Council 
on Foreign Relations (CFR) on a variety of immigration topics. He again acknowledged 
the “very difficult humanitarian conditions” at border processing facilities, in part due to 
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Congress’s lack of responsiveness to requests for additional resources.353 He referred to 
the “significant diasporas of Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and Hondurans” as a significant 
pull factor for irregular migration, a statement which this particular stakeholder community 
might view as being made in a somewhat negative context.354 Other symbolism present in 
the speech might likewise be viewed as disparaging by certain stakeholders, such as the 
characterization of migrant caravans as a “conveyer belt” of large groups.355 On a positive 
note, he continued the theme of outreach to foreign government stakeholders/partners, with 
references to cooperation such as “providing $47 million in aid to build asylum capacity in 
Guatemala” and the provision of “personnel supporting border operations in 
Guatemala.”356 
Regarding MPP specifically, McAleenan claimed DHS had “provided protections 
to hundreds of asylum seekers,” and he again praised MPP for “provid [ing] expeditious 
access and decisions for meritorious claims, and . . . discourag [ing] individuals with 
inadequate or false asylum claims” from gaining access to the United States, a statement 
which possibly lumped together non-meritorious and fraudulent claims.357 The speech did 
not dispel concerns of violence affecting MPP participants while staying in Mexico, even 
though he acknowledged the existence of some “unique asylees to whom protection is 
provided immediately, if it is deemed too dangerous from [credible] fear screenings to 
return them to Mexico.”358  
Finally, McAleenan ended his remarks to CFR with comments about an “area of 
progress [described as] fundamental,” namely “enhanc [ing] care and conditions, alleviat 
[ing] overcrowding in border facilities,” and other improvements in the ability of the 
 
353 Department of Homeland Security, “Acting Secretary McAleenan’s Prepared Remarks to the 
Council of Foreign Relations,” September 23, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/09/23/acting-
secretary-mcaleenans-prepared-remarks-council-foreign-relations. 
354 Department of Homeland Security. 
355 Department of Homeland Security. 
356 Department of Homeland Security. 
357 Department of Homeland Security. 
358 Department of Homeland Security. 
75 
government to care for detained migrants.359 This explicit acknowledgment of migrants’ 
well-being as “fundamental” stands in contrast to messaging during the parent-child 
separation policy the year before. 
October 28, 2019: In a document entitled Assessment of the Migrant Protection 
Protocols released that month, DHS provided updates on the status of MPP and offered 
additional justifications for expansion of the program.360 Noting that “MPP is a core 
component of U.S. foreign relations and bilateral cooperation with” Mexico, DHS 
attempted to elevate the posture of the program beyond a mere domestic immigration 
policy and place it in the realm of foreign relations.361 DHS continued to characterize the 
border situation as “an ongoing national emergency,” even though the statistics provided 
in the assessment purportedly demonstrate “a rapid and substantial decline in 
apprehensions in those areas where the most amenable aliens have been processed and 
returned to Mexico pursuant to MPP.”362  
Regarding benefits to stakeholders, the assessment noted without further 
quantification that “a small subset of completed cases have resulted in grants of relief or 
protection, demonstrating that MPP returnees with meritorious claims can receive asylum” 
faster through MPP than via traditional court hearings.363 DHS continued to employ 
language such as “free ticket into the United States” when describing the claims of aliens 
denied relief.364 The assessment noted that “DHS understands that MPP returnees in 
Mexico are provided access to humanitarian care and assistance, food and housing, work 
permits, and education,” although it does not identify the basis for such an “understanding” 
or outline the steps taken by DHS to ensure that these Mexican promises were actually 
fulfilled.365  
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In discussing cooperation with Northern Triangle countries “to form partnerships 
on asylum cooperation,” the document invoked the name and mandate of the “United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [(UNHCR), which] has called for international 
cooperation to face the serious challenges in responding to large-scale movement of 
migrants and asylum-seekers travelling by dangerous and irregular means.”366 This 
invocation is notable given the view among some stakeholders that MPP is in contravention 
of UNHCR requirements.367 In the concluding paragraph, the statement noted that one 
goal of MPP (a “cornerstone” of immigration efforts) is “to reduce the incentive for aliens 
to assert claims for relief or protection.”368  
October 28, 2019: In a press release regarding the opening of the Eagle Pass, Texas 
MPP court (the sixth such MPP location to open), DHS acknowledged the risk of “adverse 
court action” against DHS concerning the legality of the program, but noted its continued 
investment in the “critical program.”369 The release justified the program as “reliev [ing] 
the crushing backlog of pending cases,” but it did not explain how the operation of a 
collateral program to the existing nationwide immigration court system helps to reduce the 
backlog of cases, especially where immigration judges are re-assigned to hear MPP cases 
rather than pending non-MPP cases.370 Where DHS officials previously criticized 
Congress’s more recent inaction in passing immigration reform, here DHS referred 
favorably to the legislative branch, noting that MPP was “implemented in January 2019 in 
accordance with a law passed by Congress in 1996.”371  
January 2, 2020: DHS announced the opening of the seventh MPP location in 
Nogales, Arizona. In contrast to the statement two months earlier, this time the justification 
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for MPP’s operation was its “proven effective [ness] at reducing human smuggling across 
the Southwest Border,” rather than references to reducing the immigration court 
backlog.372 The statement again referred to Congress’s 1996 legislation authorizing the 
program and added that Congress passed the 1996 law “on a bipartisan basis.”373 The 
statement concluded that judicial disruption of the program would “most benefit those who 
seek to profit from human misery.”374 However, the statement did not mention the claims 
of stakeholders about the poor conditions in various shelters and camps in Mexico, such as 
the “thousand people . . . still living in the miserable, muddy camp along the banks of the 
river in Mexico, awaiting their chance at asylum in the U.S.”375 
January 29, 2020: DHS announced that Brazilians would now be processed under 
MPP. DHS claimed that “the fact that Brazilians are now part of the program shows that 
the Department . . . [has] always sought to expand the program in a safe and responsible 
manner.”376 In a December 2019 statement, Acting CBP Commissioner Mark Morgan 
referenced the “urgent” need to add non-Spanish-speaking individuals to MPP, who had 
previously not been subjected to MPP and were required to remain in Mexico.377 
December 7, 2020: By December, Acting Secretary Chad Wolf had taken the reins 
of DHS, becoming the third senior DHS official to exercise responsibility over the MPP 
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program. In announcing new policy guidance, Wolf took a softer tone in claiming that 
“good government means making sound policies better over time.”378  
Other undated messaging: At some point during the program, DHS posted a 
webpage in question-and-answer (Q&A) format addressing operational, legal, and other 
stakeholder issues and questions.379 The page was available in English and Spanish, with 
parts of the page also available in Portuguese. In contrast to the press releases and 
memoranda discussed above, this Q&A document was more oriented toward migrant 
stakeholders in that it provides specific information about access to counsel; issues of 
physical and mental health while in removal proceedings; links to other outside legal 
resources, such as those provided by the immigration court; media access to observe  
MPP facilities; and “Know Your Rights” documents in several languages.380 The page 
also included links to all DHS press releases on MPP and links to several “Metrics  
and Measures” documents that purport to illustrate “how DHS is meeting the intended 
goals of MPP.”381 
B. MPP POLICY CONCLUSION 
MPP lasted from January 2019 through the onset of COVID-19 in March 2020 
when hearings were suspended. During these fourteen months, three different DHS 
secretaries frequently commented about the merits of the program. Several justifications 
for MPP were used interchangeably, such as reducing the court backlog in the traditional 
immigration courts; reducing the ability of smugglers to take advantage of migrants; and 
ensuring faster decisions (which were most often denials) for MPP participants. In contrast 
to communications about the parent-child separation policy, these communications were 
more consistent, both vertically through time and horizontally across different speakers. 
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The inconsistencies in messaging previously seen during the parent-child separation policy 
were noticeably absent in the MPP-related communications. 
The analysis in the following chapter reviews the DHS’s and other U.S. government 
officials’ communications through the lens of the communications output evaluation model 
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V. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF DHS’S STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATIONS OUTPUT IN THESE TWO 
CONTROVERSIAL POLICY ROLLOUTS 
In this chapter, the thesis examines the rollouts of the parent-child separation policy 
and Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) program discussed in the prior two chapters and 
analyzes the communications output from key administration officials. This chapter 
provides a high-level overview of DHS’s approach to strategic communications in this 
context. It then reviews each case study separately using the communications output 
evaluation model previously developed and discussed in Chapter II and synthesizes the 
outcome of the evaluation. Finally, the chapter offers a frank analysis of whether DHS 
communications related to these two case studies were consistent with the factors of 
positive and effective strategic communications identified in the model.  
A. EVALUATION OVERVIEW: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The communications in Chapters III and IV vary on a spectrum ranging from 
effective, to somewhat effective, to quite ineffective at achieving positive communications 
results. As for the most effective examples of strategic communications, key officials 
involved in communications related to MPP all seemed to be on the same page. They issued 
consistent messaging, did not engage in information fratricide, did not undermine each 
other’s efforts to achieve policy successes, and did not speak publicly with messaging that 
was different than the positions the agency had previously taken. Further, the continued 
operation of the program up until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic is significant. Had 
the strategic communications issued by key DHS officials related to this program been at 
odds with each other, undermined each other, or undermined the purpose of the program 
itself, then DHS might not have continued operation of the program for so long. 
Turning to the parent-child separation case study, comparatively poor 
communications choices abound. First, messaging about key aspects of the policy 
emanated simultaneously from multiple levels of authority, from a low-ranking CBP 
attorney and Border Patrol agent, to the DHS secretary, to the attorney general, and even 
to the president. As discussed in more detail below, this variety of messaging was 
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inconsistent at best and outright contradictory at worst. In an essay for the Brookings 
Institution on political appointees, Cohen notes that “multiple layers of political appointees 
only increase the likelihood of mixed or contradictory messages and slow down the 
communication, and complicate the enforcement, of Administration policies.”382 This 
mixed messaging regarding many facets of the zero tolerance policy caused both public 
and stakeholder confusion and outrage, swift courtroom losses, and may have resulted in 
the ouster of Secretary Nielsen. This case study represents the prototypical example of 
information fratricide. It further shows the failure to achieve unity of message or clarity of 
purpose and shows a lack of Good Strategy in communications development and 
messaging.  
B. EVALUATION OF CHILD SEPARATION POLICY COMMUNICATIONS 
 Throughout this thesis, the analytical approach has been to adopt an outsider 
viewpoint, examining high-level DHS communications concerning the two case studies 
and analyzing the communications output through the lens of a measurement and 
evaluation model. The Stakeholder-Centric Strategic Communications Output Evaluation 
Model (the “model”) developed in Chapter II, as the name suggests, incorporates 
stakeholder equities throughout the communications planning and development process. 
This analysis progresses through the output evaluation model stage by stage. By identifying 
strengths and weaknesses in this manner, the two case studies are contrasted to enable a 
conclusion as to whether any improvement or worsening was apparent from one case to 
the next.  
1. Stakeholders 
The model begins with a call for listening to stakeholders prior to undertaking a 
messaging campaign or communication effort. It is not possible to know for purposes of 
this thesis whether or to what extent key officials engaged in private dialogue and listened 
to stakeholders before undertaking communications on the parent-child separation policy. 
 
382 David Cohen, “Amateur Government: When Political Appointees Manage the Federal 
Bureaucracy” (working paper, The Brookings Institution, 1996), 12, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/amateur.pdf. 
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Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that of the public events described in Chapter III, only a 
handful of events permitted the presence of immigrant community stakeholders or 
permitted media or other participant questions, according to the available sources 
describing these events.383   
It is likewise not possible to know whether or to what extent these officials sought 
to identify and distinguish among different stakeholders and publics prior to messaging. 
However, the choices of fora and attendees indicate that these officials had awareness of 
which stakeholders were likely to be less adversarial. For example, speeches before law 
enforcement groups, the military, and church leaders would be expected to be better 
received than before immigrant advocacy organizations.  
The third factor of the stakeholders section of the model, subjective human 
experience and emotion, can be seen in relatively few of the communications studied in 
this thesis, at least with regard to adversarial stakeholders such as migrant communities 
and populations. On the other hand, speakers such as Attorney General Sessions repeatedly 
appealed to Americans’ desire for a working immigration system. Other comments were 
made that can also be characterized as appeals to subjective human experience and 
emotion.  
Finally, it is important to assess whether information asymmetry exists across 
different instances of messaging, and if so, whether such asymmetry was intentional or 
unintentional. The communications discussed in Chapter III do not demonstrate any 
significant asymmetry.384 There were no identified instances from publicly available 
documents of DHS releasing more information to certain stakeholders and less information 
to others. Nor is there any indication that having access to more information gave certain 
stakeholders a relative or competitive advantage in any way. The analysis next turns to 
various types of strategy and whether these factors were identified in the example 
communications about the parent-child separation policy. 
 
383 These events were the October 2017 El Paso meeting, Secretary Nielsen’s congressional 
testimony, and the June 2018 White House press briefing. 
384 Press releases were available via the Internet and speeches were either made in a public forum or a 
transcript or readout was readily available of speeches made at secure locations such as CBP ports of entry. 
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2. Strategy 
 In analyzing strategic communications output, it is helpful to first consider 
Rumelt’s formulation of Good and Bad Strategy with respect to an organization’s strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This section of the evaluation model considers 
initially whether the example communications demonstrate simplicity and planned 
strategy. A follow-up to planned strategy analysis is whether any unexpected strategy has 
emerged as a matter of stakeholder participation or unforeseen consequences.  
a. Planned Strategy 
It is admittedly difficult from the outsider analyst perspective adopted in this thesis 
to assess planned strategy on the part of DHS during this policy rollout. While key strengths 
and weaknesses can be identified from the examples of communications, it is challenging 
to assess whether the use of such strengths (or failures due to weaknesses) are intentional 
elements of strategy or are simply aspects of strategy which emerged due to unforeseen 
consequences or stakeholder participation. It is also quite possible that both occurred.385  
Nonetheless, a key strength that became apparent during the parent-child separation 
policy rollout was creating strong, emotional messaging. Top officials created emotional, 
strongly worded messages and delivered them with vigor. While this policy was ultimately 
halted by the courts and by President Trump, perhaps in part due to the mixed messaging 
and failure to fully engage stakeholders, the fact nonetheless remains that the statements of 
Attorney General Sessions and Secretary Nielsen were examples of strong rhetoric. 
Arguably, the use of such rhetoric was an intentional and planned strategic choice, possibly 
made to pivot away from prior usage of strategic silence. The prior usage of silence had 
backfired during the 2017 secret El Paso pilot discussed in Chapter III. For Attorney 
General Sessions to refer to migrants as invading and stampeding the United States, 
 
385 Without expanding the research design to include internal documents and communications beyond 
the scope of the present research, attempting to discern planned strategy is admittedly speculative in the 
absence of affirmative strategy-related statements by officials. 
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painting them as enemies and animals, respectively, is certainly an intentional choice of 
language and evidence of planned strategic use of strong, emotional messaging.386 
b. Participatory Strategy 
 It is important to consider alternative explanations of this messaging, such as 
whether participatory strategy is apparent from DHS’s communications during this policy 
rollout. The question for evaluation and analysis is whether there is evidence of common 
meaning being created through the communications efforts in a way that emphasizes key 
strengths or weaknesses of DHS.387 This question implies a progression of understanding 
and development of common meaning on the part of DHS, stakeholders, or both, 
throughout the communications process and policy rollout. 
 An area of developed shared understanding between key officials and stakeholders 
concerns whether or not the zero tolerance policy was intended to have a deterrent effect. 
There is evidence of progression of understanding on the part of DHS, as various officials 
are on record denying the existence of deterrent intent (CBP officials and Secretary 
Nielsen). In contrast, subsequent statements by other officials reflect the existence of 
deterrent intent (Attorney General Sessions). Such progression in understanding is likewise 
visible on the part of stakeholders such as the media and immigrant advocacy groups when 
examining what occurred following the October 2017 El Paso meeting and when reviewing 
the questions posed to officials during the June 2018 White House briefing. These 
stakeholders, while previously unaware of a forthcoming zero tolerance policy during the 
 
386 Horwitz and Sacchetti, “Sessions Vows to Prosecute.” 
387 This question is based on a synthesis of Falkheimer and Heide’s notion of participatory strategy 
and Rumelt’s general understanding of Good Strategy. Falkheimer and Heide’s participatory strategy 
includes wide stakeholder engagement and is also referred to as democratizing strategy or open strategy. 
Falkheimer and Heide argued that in the context of participatory strategy, “strategic communications 
between organizations and stakeholders will be less relevant to the larger question of how common 
meaning is created.” Macnamara and Gregory, “Expanding Evaluation to Progress Strategic 
Communication,” 471; Matzler et al., “Open Strategy: Towards a Research Agenda”; Falkheimer and 
Heide, “Strategic Communication in Participatory Culture,” 340. 
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early days of the secret El Paso pilot program, came to believe that the administration 
intended for the policy to have a deterrent effect on future migration of family units.388 
 As for whether this shared understanding emphasizes key strengths or weaknesses 
of DHS such that a strategy is discernible, there is no evidence to indicate that the 
development of shared understanding concerning deterrence emphasized any key 
communications strengths on the part of DHS. To the contrary, as the media and other 
critics hammered DHS and White House staff on the deterrence factor in the face of official 
denials by Secretary Nielsen and Press Secretary Sanders, an important weakness emerged: 
the apparent failure of officials to coordinate messaging on a vital aspect of the policy. The 
communications of officials such as Secretary Kelly and Attorney General Sessions were 
at utter odds with those of Nielsen and Sanders on this point. While it is not possible to 
know for purposes of this thesis whether these officials were truly unable or unwilling to 
achieve transparency and consistency of messaging on this important issue, the failure of 
the government to speak with one voice in support of the policy is fairly interpreted as a 
strategic weakness in the final analysis.  
c. Emergent Strategy 
 Finally, the strategy section of the model asks whether there is evidence of other 
types of emergent strategy rooted in unforeseen consequences. One example of a strategy 
that emerged due to unforeseen consequences concerns the use of emotional messaging in 
response to emotional outrage from stakeholders. As noted above, a key strength that 
became apparent during the parent-child separation policy rollout was creating strong, 
emotional messaging, delivered with vigor. Yet it did not appear that the use of this strength 
was intended or planned in the early days of the zero tolerance policy. Indeed, during the 
secret El Paso pilot, there were no public communications whatsoever on the policy, much 
less any communications that utilized this strength. It was only after the local pilot policy 
became public in late 2017, after DOJ officially rolled out the border-wide zero tolerance 
 
388 E.g., Beth Van Schaack, “New Proof Surfaces That Family Separation Was about Deterrence and 
Punishment,” Just Security, November 27, 2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/61621/proof-surfaces-
family-separation-deterrence-punishment/. 
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policy in April 2018, and after public, media, and stakeholder outrage became apparent 
that officials pivoted to the use of tailored, emotional, and strongly worded messaging, in 
a possible display of emergent strategy.389  
3. Messaging 
 The model next examines factors related to messaging, the mid-level section of the 
evaluation model which corresponds to the tactical aspects of the agency’s 
communications.   
a. Information Fratricide 
Clear, consistent, and transparent messaging was not a characteristic of the zero 
tolerance policy communications. One of the primary and most important findings from 
this research concerns the information fratricide and lack of consistent messaging that 
occurred throughout the parent-child separation policy rollout. Speakers were inconsistent 
about the onset dates of the policy, both locally in El Paso and nationally; about the 
motivation for the policy and whether it was intended as a deterrent; and whether the policy 
was intended as a criminal law enforcement policy or as a family separation policy to deter 
migration.390 As a result, each subsequent speaker’s credibility was diminished and these 
communications problems obscured and outright prevented a frank and transparent 
discussion of the policy merits. A good example of this is the multiple communications 
from CBP officials in late 2017 about the existence or non-existence of a separation policy, 
where at least five different CBP officials were on record providing different and at times 
conflicting information about the nature of a separation policy, if one existed.391 This lack 
of clear, unified messaging about a policy that garnered so much public attention is 
astounding. 
 
389 It is not known from this thesis research whether such outrage was truly an unforeseen 
circumstance for the administration, since separating parents and children was predictably a controversial 
policy idea. Assuming that it was an unforeseen consequence, then the administration’s pivot to the use of 
strong, emotional messaging is an example of a communications strategy which emerged following this 
unforeseen circumstance. 
390 Chapter III discusses examples of speakers of all levels of government making oral and written 
public statements on these issues which proved to be at odds with one another. 
391 Kriel, “Trump Moves to End.” 
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 The unraveling of these inconsistencies came to a head at the June 2018 press 
briefing where Secretary Nielsen had Attorney General Sessions’s deterrence comments 
thrown back at her.392 Rather than address the reporter’s pointed comparison between 
Nielsen’s and Session’s claims on deterrence, she answered, “that’s not the question that 
you asked me” and returned to discussing Congress’s role in passing appropriate laws.393 
Two days later, the situation continued to escalate and President Trump issued his 
executive order to roll back the enforcement policy.394  
 At other times, the same DHS official made statements conflicting with his or her 
own prior comments. For example, DHS Secretary Kelly stated in March 2017 “that he 
‘would do almost anything to deter’ Central American migration.”395 In later reporting, 
Kelly claimed “separations would occur only in extenuating circumstances such as an 
illness.”396 However, separation only in cases of child endangerment or illness is much 
different than doing “almost anything” to deter migration as a general matter.397 Had the 
administration been operating on a cleaner slate without the inconsistent messaging and 
information fratricide, it is possible that the policy might not have come to such an abrupt 
end or that it could have been modified in a way that it was acceptable to the courts and 
stakeholders. 
b. Timing of Messaging 
The use or misuse of timing of messaging is also an important takeaway, especially 
as it relates to the use of strategic silence. This aspect of the messaging section of the model 
asks when it is appropriate to initiate communications on a given subject and how long an 
organization should refrain from public discussion. The secret El Paso pilot was not 
publicly announced in advance or as it was rolled out, and only later came to light after it 
 
392 Sanders and Nielsen, “Press Briefing.” 
393 Sanders and Nielsen. 
394 Trump, Executive Order 13841. 
395 Eagly, “Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing,” 1992. 
396 Kriel, “Trump Moves to End.” 
397 As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the impact of COVID-19 on enforcement policies after the 
onset of the pandemic is outside the scope of this thesis.  
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was well underway and stakeholders in El Paso “heard increasing numbers of migrants talk 
of their children being taken away — and having no idea where they were.”398 It was not 
until four months later that a local Border Patrol agent admitted, “the new policy is that we 
can separate children as long as they are 10 or over.”399  
It is not clear from public documents and reporting what the agency gained, if 
anything, from conducting this pilot in secret rather than disclosing its existence to 
stakeholders up front. To the contrary, by conducting the pilot in secret, the agency lost the 
ability to be the first to frame the policy issues for public consideration.400 Intentional use 
of “the ‘inoculation’ effect,” which refers to the release of information in advance of a 
confrontational situation so that the non-disclosure of information cannot be used against 
the releasor in the future, might have resulted in a more favorable long-term perception of 
the pilot program.401 At a minimum, disclosure of the pilot program would have provided 
the administration with the talking point that the pilot was being conducted in a transparent 
manner. 
To be sure, there are valid reasons for conducting pilot programs in secret. Giving 
a program a head start and the time needed to develop sufficient data supporting the 
efficacy of a program before public disclosure might be effective for justifying the program 
in the future, both to stakeholders and in litigation. This rationale, of course, relies on the 
assumption that such program data are sufficient to overcome any adverse opinion or 
perceptions of a policy. Next, operational details of a program might be sensitive and there 
may be an investigative need for secrecy, although this rationale may be inapposite where 
details of a policy necessarily become public through anecdotal reporting as soon as a 
 
398 The House committee investigation showed that the 2017 secret El Paso pilot began as early as 
“July 2017, [when] the Administration began a secret pilot program to separate children and their parents 
arriving at the border in the El Paso sector.” “House Oversight Report,” 10; Seville and Rappleye, “Trump 
Admin Ran Pilot.” 
399 Seville and Rappleye, “Trump Admin Ran Pilot.” 
400 As discussed in Chapter II, an agency which attempts to employ strategic silence runs the risk that 
an adversary will have the opportunity to discover adverse information about the agency’s operations and 
gain the chance to frame the issues first for the public and stakeholders. Stephens, Hill, and Greenberg, 
Strategic Communication Practices, 12, 91. 
401 Stephens, Hill, and Greenberg, 91. 
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policy rollout begins. Finally, concern about litigation and the possibility of restraining 
orders or injunctions are other possible reasons for secrecy. No policymaker wants to roll 
out a program only to have it immediately enjoined by a court. However, these potential 
reasons for silence are in tension with the need from a communications perspective to be 
first out of the gate, to claim the opportunity to frame the issues for further discourse. An 
agency weighing communications timing issues should anticipate these tensions and 
develop proactive communications accordingly, if possible. 
c. Dark Side of Communications 
Next, the messaging section of the evaluation model inquires into any usage or 
exploration of the Dark Side of strategic communications.402 The communications 
concerning the zero tolerance policy reveal several possible instances of Dark Side 
communications. One example is the House committee data which show that “some parents 
who were separated from their children were never sent to U.S. Marshals or other federal 
criminal custody, but instead went straight from CBP custody to ICE detention,” despite 
the administration’s claims that the separations were all due to criminal enforcement 
against the parents.403 Such non-prosecution cases are problematic in that they contradict 
the administration’s stated goal of increased criminal enforcement of border-crossing 
violations.  
The DHS statement from March which “ask [ed] that members of the public and 
media view advocacy group claims that we are separating women and children for reasons 
other than to protect the child with the level of skepticism they deserve” is relevant to the 
Dark Side analysis.404 This statement raises the question whether the statement is an 
example of the speaker using unfortunate language while on the defensive or if something 
darker was occurring, such as a deliberate attempt at stakeholder alienation.  
 
402 When reviewing an organization’s communications output, an unbiased analyst must be careful 
not to assume Dark Side motivations simply due to the presence of conflicting or ambiguous information, 
as other explanations may exist for a communication to have these qualities. Clear evidence is needed to 
definitely assign such Dark Side motivations to a speaker. 
403 “House Oversight Report,” 21. 
404 Kennedy, “ACLU Sues ICE.” 
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 Another possible Dark Side communication relates to White House Press Secretary 
Sarah Sanders’s comment in June 2018 about the “number of individuals that are 
permanently separated from their families due to the illegal aliens that have come across 
this border and murdered and killed American citizens.”405 This apples and oranges 
argument does not acknowledge that a significant number of Americans oppose the 
criminalization of illegal entry or the manner in which 18 U.S.C. § 1325 has been 
enforced.406  
 Without further research and review of internal communications and documents, it 
is not possible to definitively conclude for purposes of this thesis that such communications 
were intentionally inaccurate, conflicting, or ambiguous. Multiple alternative explanations 
are possible, such as that high-ranking officials were unaware of or had not been fully 
briefed on any exceptions to the policy where a separation might have occurred but there 
was no criminal prosecution. It is also possible that different officials who had roles in the 
development and rollout of the policy each had differing rationales and motivations, and 
that no unified effort was made to ensure all public speakers employed uniform messaging 
on this issue. Nonetheless, this case study teaches that inaccurate or ambiguous messaging 
about controversial subjects, whether intentional or not, creates the likelihood of 
retrospective accusations of Dark Side messaging by the media and adversarial 
stakeholders. To the extent that clearer communications may mitigate this possibility, such 
clarity is a worthwhile goal of messaging development. 
d. Information End-States 
Finally, the messaging section of the model examines whether any desired 
information end-states were present and if the messaging were tailed to such desired end-
states. Identifying information end-states is helpful to making real progress in strategic 
communication, since it forces decision-makers “to consider the information environment 
 
405 Sanders and Nielsen, “Press Briefing.” 
406 Eagly, “Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing,” 2016; Bixby, “Trump Has No Idea.” 
“According to a new Ipsos poll . . . only 27 percent of respondents agree that it is ‘appropriate to separate 
undocumented immigrant parents from their children when they cross the border in order to discourage 
others from crossing the border illegally.’” 
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and communication consequences” all the way down the chain of command.407 Officials 
responsible for making tactical decisions about messaging should consider the desired 
perception of a message by recipients and stakeholders and consider how a message may 
be received, taken in or out of context, or even rejected. It is not enough for a 
communication to be consistent and on message, accurately and clearly state the 
organization’s position, be well timed, and avoid information fratricide. It must also 
accomplish something in the mind of the recipient, and it is that “something” that 
information end-states seek to understand. As with other factors discussed above, it is not 
possible for purposes of this thesis to definitively conclude what various speakers had in 
mind for information end-states (if anything at all), without further research and review of 
internal communications and documents. 
In sum, a significant amount of inconsistency and information fratricide occurred 
concerning the onset dates of the policy, the motivation for the policy and whether it was 
intended as a deterrent, and whether the policy was intended as a criminal law enforcement 
policy or as a family separation policy to deter migration. The timing of messaging and 
inappropriate use of strategic silence concerning the El Paso pilot placed the 
administration’s messaging on the defensive and resulted in a lost opportunity for use of 
the inoculation effect.  
4. Language 
The model last examines factors related to language, the lowest-level section of the 
evaluation model which corresponds to the operational, the so-called on-the-ground, 
aspects of an agency’s communications.  
a. Tone 
The communications on the child-separation policy reflect a great deal of variation 
in tone. Although some of the communications were delivered orally, this thesis considers 
 
407 Paul, Strategic Communication Origins, 177. 
93 
those communications after they were transcribed and thus considers only aspects of tone 
in the written word.408 
Usage of tone in the parent-child separation case ranges from detached and non-
emotional language to the use of emotionally charged and likely offensive language heavy 
with connotation. For example, the “Frequently Asked Questions: Zero Tolerance 
Immigration Prosecutions” document, which DHS posted online in June 2018, was of a 
much more neutral tone than statements at the other end of the spectrum, such as many of 
Attorney General Sessions’s comments on the policy.409 Such openly hostile language 
toward stakeholders and beneficiaries of immigration policy is likely to have unpredictable 
effects upon efforts to execute planned communications strategy or achieve effective 
messaging output. If the pro-strong-enforcement demographic were the only public that 
mattered, such language would probably be effective and well advised. However, other 
stakeholders with different perspectives exist, and the effects of language and tone upon 
these stakeholders cannot be discarded. Such language triggers subjective human 
experience and emotion (a factor from the stakeholders section of the model) and impacts 
emergent strategy. To the extent that not all speakers are willing or able to engage in the 
same level of charged rhetoric, consistency problems and even information fratricide can 
arise if stark differences in tone are conflated with differences in substantive messaging.  
The use of defensive language is another aspect of tone which is observable during 
the parent-child separation policy rollout. Both Secretary Nielsen and Attorney General 
Sessions gave speeches in June 2018 hoping to dispel “misinformation about what DHS is 
and is not doing as it relates to families at the border.”410 Why DHS and DOJ did not take 
proactive steps to communicate about the policy prior to its rollout went unexplained 
 
408 “Tone in writing refers to the writer’s attitude toward the reader and the subject of the message. 
The overall tone of a written message affects the reader just as one’s tone of voice affects the listener in 
everyday exchanges.” Purdue University, “Tone in Business Writing,” Purdue Online Writing Lab, 
accessed February 13, 2021, https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/subject_specific_writing/
professional_technical_writing/tone_in_business_writing.html; Scott Ober, Contemporary Business 
Communication (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), 88. 
409 Department of Homeland Security, “FAQs: Zero Tolerance Prosecutions.” 
410 Sanders and Nielsen, “Press Briefing”; Department of Justice, “Sessions Addresses Recent 
Criticisms.” 
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during these speeches. As noted earlier, misuse of strategic silence runs the risk that an 
adversary may frame the issues first for the public and stakeholders, putting the agency on 
the defensive.411 A few other aspects of Sessions’s church leader speech were notable, 
such as his use of a false dichotomy in presenting a binary choice between open borders or 
enforcement of laws.412 He did not explain why the situation presented no middle ground. 
Such use of defensive communications presents several obstacles to effective 
strategic communications. According to Gibb’s work on defensive communications, the 
use of defensive messaging “prevents the listener from concentrating upon the message. 
Not only do defensive communicators send off multiple value, motive and affect cues, but 
also defensive recipients distort what they receive. . . . [d]efensive behavior [s have been] 
correlated positively with losses in efficiency in communication.”413 This suggests that 
had Nielsen and Sessions presented the same information earlier in the policy rollout as 
they did in June 2018, prior to their perceived need to counter “fake news” and 
“misinformation,” there might have been a more fulsome appreciation of their messaging 
by stakeholders. 
b. Identification of Audiences and Publics 
The issues of tone are necessarily related to the second factor of the language 
section of the model, the identification of audiences and publics for a given message. The 
conventional wisdom that communications should be tailored to the audience is in tension 
with the present reality that “communication professionals have never been able to define 
with any certainty who is part of a public, and have almost never been able to influence 
them to do what the organization wishes.”414 Because of the illusory nature of control of 
 
411 Stephens, Hill, and Greenberg, Strategic Communication Practices, 12, 91. 
412 Department of Justice, “Sessions Addresses Recent Criticisms.” 
413 Jack R. Gibb, “Defensive Communication,” ETC: A Review of General Semantics 22, no. 2 (June 
1965): 221–22, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42574118. 
414 Falkheimer and Heide, “Strategic Communication in Participatory Culture,” 344. 
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communications, the determination of the appropriate audience for a given communication 
must be made loosely and with flexibility in mind.415  
With this understanding, it is helpful to distinguish between the primary audience 
of a message and any secondary or subsequent distribution of a message. None of the 
communications identified in Chapter III stand out as particularly inappropriate for their 
primary audience. The problem arises when considering the secondary and subsequent 
distribution of communications in the internet age. The possibility that a speaker can make 
remarks to one audience without further distribution to a secondary audience is likely no 
longer reasonable. This is especially true where the media are in attendance or where 
prepared remarks are posted to the agency’s website, as with Sessions’s speeches.416 A 
high-level speaker thus should not consider him or herself able to vary the use of language 
across audiences to a significant extent.417  
c. Degree of Disclosure and Use of Ambiguity 
The two related factors of degree of disclosure and use of ambiguity examine the 
operational-level implementation of message timing, desired information asymmetry, and 
possibly, resort to the Dark Side of communications.418 The legitimate use of ambiguity 
allows for flexibility, preserves deniability, and allows pivoting among varying rationales 
for a policy should such adaptability be needed.419  
The parent-child separation policy case study contains several examples of 
ambiguous messaging, but the evidence does not support effective use of this device to 
move forward the administration’s communications agenda. For example, a variety of 
 
415 Falkheimer and Heide, 347. 
416 Department of Justice, “Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Association of State 
Criminal Investigative Agencies 2018 Spring Conference,” May 7, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/
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Justice, “Sessions Addresses Recent Criticisms.” 
417 A detailed discussion of the effects of the internet on broadening, perhaps infinitely, the potential 
audience and reach of a controversial speech is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
418 These factors of the language section of the model inquire into the relative transparency or opacity 
of communications, and relatedly, whether communications use clear or ambiguous language. 
419 Dulek and Campbell, “On the Dark Side,” 132; Eisenberg, “Ambiguity as Strategy.” 
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statements were made about the policy’s deterrent effect, but these statements remained 
ambiguous as to what exactly was to be deterred. When questioned about the deterrence 
effect at the June 2018 press briefing, Secretary Nielsen did not even attempt an appropriate 
use of ambiguity as a means to attempt reconciliation with prior affirmative statements on 
the deterrent effect.420 Instead, she simply denied having the intention to separate parents 
from children and claimed to find the question “offensive.”421  
The specific choice of words used in a communication plays a role in the perceived 
ambiguity of a statement. The email from the CBP attorney to the El Paso community 
meeting attendees is remarkable in this respect for several reasons, including the measured 
use of “blanket policy” and “primarily,” signaling (perhaps unintentionally) that there 
might be an ad hoc policy of separation, or that other non-prosecution related reasons for 
separation may be a non-“primary” reason for the uptick in separations. Another example 
is the March 2018 statement that “DHS . . . retain [s] the authority to [separate] in certain 
circumstances—particularly to protect a child from potential smuggling and trafficking 
activities.”422 Yet in the eyes of stakeholders, any purported daylight between an official 
“policy” of separation and the “authority” to take certain action may be a distinction 
without a difference, and an example of intentional use of ambiguous messaging or even 
failure to consider stakeholders’ views and the likely audience.  
For a different example of ambiguity, Secretary Nielsen remarked “in April [2018] 
DHS aim [ed] to keep families together ‘as long as operationally possible’” and that “there 
is no policy that calls for the separation of families as a deterrence.”423 While it is 
technically true that there has been no official policy made public that calls for either zero 
tolerance or family separation as a “deterrent,” this comment is nonetheless disingenuous. 
It fails to answer the question whether deterrence was a desired effect of the zero tolerance 
policy. Further, her circular statement of the administration’s intent did not at all make 
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clear whether the policy on separation was dependent upon operational feasibility, or if it 
were the other way around and desired policy outcomes drove operational decisions. Thus, 
a recurring inconsistency among DHS communications on the policy concerned whether 
the policy was one of parent-child or family separation, or it if was zero tolerance criminal 
enforcement for illegal border crossers. Such semantic disputes are a false dichotomy 
because separations and criminal border enforcement are so intricately related that the 
policy could be both.  
In sum, the language section of the model demonstrates disadvantageous use of 
tone and defensive language. Administration officials could have made more effective use 
of ambiguity to preserve flexibility for future policy changes and attempt reconciliation 
with seemingly inconsistent prior messaging. 
C. EVALUATION OF MPP POLICY COMMUNICATIONS  
 The following section progresses through the output evaluation model stage by 
stage and reviews the MPP-related communications from Chapter IV. As discussed below, 
this analysis reveals that DHS learned the value of communications and employed a more 
measured tone, consistent messaging, and straightforward approach than seen during the 
parent-child separation policy. 
1. Stakeholders 
Unlike the prior case study, many of the MPP-related press releases and 
communications contain references to stakeholders and their interests, including migrant 
populations that may be adversarial to the goals of MPP. For example, the January 24, 2019 
press release issued in advance of MPP’s rollout in San Diego referred to “the urgent 
humanitarian and security crisis at the Southern border,” and acknowledged the need to 
“ensur [e] that vulnerable populations receive the protections they need.”424 Later during 
MPP’s rollout, Secretary McAleenan discussed the “fundamental” need to “enhance care 
and conditions, alleviate overcrowding in border facilities,” and make other improvements 
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in the government’s ability to care for detained migrants.425 This explicit acknowledgment 
of migrants’ well-being as “fundamental” represents inclusion of stakeholder interests in 
MPP messaging. Further, DHS identified and sought to appeal to stakeholders other than 
migrant communities during the MPP rollout, such as law enforcement and military 
stakeholders.426 
Unlike what was noted in the first case study analysis, the communications 
regarding MPP do not demonstrate any significant information asymmetry.427 To the 
contrary, the evidence indicates that DHS actively shared transparent information about 
MPP’s current operations and future plans. For example, DHS posted a webpage in 
question-and-answer format addressing operational, legal, and other stakeholder issues and 
questions.428 The page was available in multiple languages and included links to all DHS 
press releases on MPP and several “Metrics and Measures” documents.429 Overall, DHS’s 
communications during the MPP rollout demonstrate an increased level of attentiveness 
and consideration of stakeholder interests compared to that previously seen during the 
parent-child separation policy.  
2. Strategy 
 This section of the evaluation model considers whether the example 
communications demonstrate simplicity and planned strategy that appropriately utilize key 
communications strengths. A follow-up to planned strategy analysis is whether any 
unexpected strategy has emerged as a matter of stakeholder participation or unforeseen 
consequences. 
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a. Planned Strategy 
A key strength of DHS communicators was utilizing awareness of potential pending 
outrage and litigation due to the subject matter of the policy. Unlike during the first case 
study, the messaging was far more refined and less emotional than previously seen during 
the child separation policy. This refinement possibly signals an awareness that restraint 
was needed in messaging due to pending stakeholder outrage and, perhaps more 
importantly to the program’s ongoing success, future litigation that could threaten the 
policy’s existence. For example, at least one press release regarding the opening of the 
sixth MPP court location acknowledged the risk of “adverse court action” but also noted 
DHS’s continued investment in the “critical program.”430 This language signals that 
communications decisions were being made considering their future impact on litigation. 
 A second key strength was apparent in the communications regarding partnerships 
with regional nation partners, such as Mexico and Guatemala, formed to implement MPP 
and related programs. The administration was able to capitalize on diplomatic successes 
with these nations in its public communications.431 For example, Secretary McAleenan’s 
embrace of the theme of outreach to foreign government stakeholders and partners, and 
DHS’s publication of the MPP assessment document proclaiming that “MPP is a core 
component of U.S. foreign relations and bilateral cooperation with” Mexico, both serve as 
examples of this diplomatic posturing.432 This elevated the status of the program beyond 
a mere domestic immigration policy and placed it in the realm of foreign relations. This 
successful planned communications strategy made it difficult for critics of the program to 
argue that increased cooperation with foreign governments or providing foreign aid to 
regional partners was a bad thing. This strategy further insulated these portions of the 
policy from strong criticism.  
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b. Participatory Strategy  
 In terms of any manifestations of participatory strategy apparent in the MPP-related 
communications, a prominent example is the common meaning created through the near-
universal adoption of the “remain in Mexico” label to describe the MPP program. Although 
DHS labeled the program as the Migrant Protection Protocols, the program quickly became 
known as the “remain in Mexico” program by the media and stakeholders.433 
 Unlike in the previous case study where DHS eschewed the “parent-child 
separation policy” label in favor of “zero tolerance,” this time DHS did not shy away from 
the growing usage of the “remain in Mexico” label to describe MPP. Indeed, press releases 
throughout the program used this exact language (with the addition that DHS “allows” 
MPP participants to remain in Mexico).434 Development of this common meaning allowed 
DHS to capitalize on the two strengths discussed above: the awareness of potential pending 
outrage and litigation due to the subject matter of the policy, and the ability to build upon 
and communicate regarding diplomatic successes with partner nations.  
 Use of the former strength is demonstrated because unlike the concept of “parent-
child separation,” there is nothing inherently controversial about an alien spending time or 
remaining in Mexico, a country which most MPP participants voluntarily entered and 
transited during their northward journey to the U.S. border. Awareness of when a potential 
catchphrase is likely to cause outrage or not, and when a phrase used by stakeholders should 
be co-opted, is a helpful strategic strength. The second strength, the ability to communicate 
regarding diplomatic successes, is demonstrated with the use of the “remain in Mexico” 
language, since the phrase impliedly nods toward Mexico’s acceptance of the program and 
the underlying diplomatic agreements. 
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c. Emergent Strategy 
 Lastly, the strategy section of the model inquiries whether there is evidence of other 
types of emergent strategy rooted in unforeseen consequences. Some of these 
consequences include the alleged lack of access to U.S.-based counsel while participants 
remained in Mexico, along with claims that forcing MPP participants to remain in Mexico 
unnecessarily subjected them to risk of harm or violence while in Mexico.435 However, 
there is little evidence that these potentially unforeseen consequences caused DHS to alter 
its strategic communications trajectory, and DHS was largely able to sidestep both issues.  
 DHS squarely addressed the access to counsel issue in initial press releases and 
other publications and it reiterated its long-standing position about an alien’s right to 
choose counsel at the alien’s expense and right to access local legal providers.436 This 
status-quo communications approach appears to have been successful, as the access to 
counsel issue never became problematic during the program rollout.  
 Regarding the second unforeseen consequence, the claimed risk of violence to MPP 
participants while in Mexico, DHS utilized its strength of communicating regarding 
diplomatic successes to sidestep this criticism as well. For example, Acting CBP 
Commissioner Morgan deflected by stating that Mexico had the “responsibility to provide 
security for migrants en route to their court hearings on the U.S. side” when asked about 
the risk of violence.437 He further created doubt regarding “the accounts of kidnappings 
and disappearances of migrants at the hands of criminal cartels,” stating, “I don’t believe 
that. We are not receiving that information from the government of Mexico.”438 While a 
stakeholder hearing this statement might doubt the credibility of this source of information, 
Morgan’s reference to official information from the Mexican government serves to 
externalize the issue and repel criticism away from DHS. For these reasons, unforeseen 
consequences did not cause DHS to alter its strategic communications trajectory. Thus, 
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emergent strategy did not play as significant a role during the MPP rollout as it did during 
the parent-child separation policy. 
3. Messaging 
 The model next examines factors related to messaging, the mid-level section of the 
evaluation model which corresponds to the tactical aspects of the agency’s communications 
output. These aspects include coordination of messaging, avoiding information fratricide, 
timing of messaging, and use of the Dark Side of communications.  
a. Lack of Information Fratricide 
 During the MPP rollout, DHS primarily issued public communications in the form 
of press releases or statements from the three officials who served as DHS secretary during 
the period the program was active. These statements were remarkably consistent and 
speakers remained on message, especially compared to the inconsistencies seen during the 
parent-child separation policy.439 For example, in August 2019 Secretary McAleenan 
made public comments and referred to the need for congressional reform and support of 
DHS’s initiatives to improve the border situation.440 These comments were consistent with 
those of his predecessor, Secretary Nielsen, on the issue of Congress’s shared responsibility 
for fixing the immigration system. The language in his comments in this regard was less 
accusatory and more measured.  
b. Timing of Messaging 
The use of timing of messaging during MPP was also markedly different than the 
parent-child separation policy. DHS initiated public conversation about the rollout in late 
2018, over a month before the opening of the first MPP location in California.441 By being 
first to publicly discuss the upcoming program, DHS gained the chance to frame the issues 
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for the public and stakeholders.442 This release of information and exercise in transparency 
in advance of a confrontational situation allowed DHS to take advantage of the inoculation 
effect, which likely resulted in a more favorable long-term perception of the program and 
allowed for its subsequent expansion to more sites along the southern border.443   
Further, Secretary Nielsen’s framing of the need for the program in the context of 
“the urgent humanitarian and security crisis at the Southern border” allowed DHS to 
characterize its new policy as essentially an affirmative response to an emergency.444 Such 
framing arguably reduced the likelihood that DHS would be placed on the defensive. Later 
in 2019, Secretary McAleenan built upon this stance by releasing messaging related to 
DHS’s diplomatic successes with Mexico and Guatemala on both MPP and asylum 
policy.445 This messaging was an effective implementation of strategy and use of the key 
strength of communicating regarding diplomatic partnerships. 
c. Dark Side of Communications 
Turning to the factor of usage of the Dark Side of strategic communications, this 
research into MPP-related communications did not reveal any obvious examples of DHS 
releasing inaccurate, conflicting, incomplete, or otherwise unsavory information as a 
matter of strategy.446 Many of the MPP communications were transparent and forthcoming 
about DHS’s intentions with the program. In a reuse of deterrence language from the 
parent-child separation policy, Secretary McAleenan noted that ongoing operation of MPP 
“will deter people who don’t have valid asylum claims.”447 Unlike the previous policy 
rollout, however, there was no confusion or ambiguity about this intended deterrent effect. 
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Likewise, statements about replacing “‘catch and release’ . . . with ‘catch and return’” were 
transparent and clear about DHS’s intentions in rolling out the MPP program.448  
d. Information End-States 
To definitively conclude what various speakers had in mind for information end-
states, further research and review of internal communications and documents would be 
required. However, it is a fair assumption that speakers such as Secretaries Nielsen and 
McAleenan were aware of the public relations fallout during and after the parent-child 
separation policy. In other words, at least one desired information end-state during MPP 
was likely that the public and stakeholders would come to accept the operation of the policy 
as the new status quo and method of processing border crossing cases post-January 2019. 
Choices of messaging in pursuit of this information end-state were largely effective and 
tailored toward “consider [ing] the information environment and communication 
consequences” all the way down the chain of command.449 Officials put forth messaging 
that was clear, transparent, and consistent about how MPP was to be rolled out, both in 
advance and during the actual rollout and expansion to more locations. This messaging 
proved to be largely successful in achieving a favorable information end-state up until the 
suspension of MPP hearings at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Overall, MPP messaging was generally consistent from one speaker to the next and 
key pronouncements were delivered by official DHS press release or by high-level 
speakers such as the DHS secretary. This messaging was not undercut by contradictory 
statements by other senior or lower-level officials, as seen in the prior case study. The 
timing of messaging demonstrated a level of transparency and intention to inform the 
public in advance of the pending policy rollout, which was an important use of the 
inoculation effect.  
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4. Language 
The model last examines factors related to language, the lowest-level section of the 
evaluation model which corresponds to the operational aspects of DHS’s communications 
on the MPP policy. 
a. Tone 
As with the parent-child separation policy, the MPP communications exhibit 
variation in tone. The formal press releases generally had a neutral tone and presented 
factual information about the policy rollout, while speeches and other public commentary 
by specific officials took a more adversarial attitude. Certain press releases and 
announcements took an adversarial or antagonistic tone as well.  
For example, Secretary Nielsen’s December 2018 announcement about MPP 
framed the need for the policy as an “illegal immigration crisis.”450 Although the statement 
made a token reference to the United States’ “humanitarian commitments,” the statement 
quickly returned to stronger language such as “aliens trying to game the system,” and 
disappear and “skip their court dates.”451 Despite the strong tone, the statement was 
comparatively transparent and clear about DHS’s intentions in rolling out the MPP 
program.452 Similarly, the primary benefits of MPP touted in the January 2019 press 
release were “reduc [ing] the number of aliens taking advantage of U.S. law and discourag 
[ing] false asylum claims,” and preventing aliens from “disappear [ing] into the U.S. before 
a court issues a final decision” on their cases.453 These statements reflect an antagonistic 
position and attitude toward at least some of the MPP participants. 
Subsequently, DHS Secretary McAleenan likewise took an adversarial position vis-
à-vis immigrant stakeholders in criticizing the purported asylum claims of a large majority 
of asylum seekers, noting that the asylum process is “not a pathway to an economic 
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migration or to choose what country you want to live in.”454 DHS employed arguably 
divisive language such as “free ticket into the United States” when describing the claims 
of aliens denied relief.455 In contrast, in January 2019 guidance, Secretary Nielsen took a 
somewhat conciliatory and stakeholder-centric tone in promising that MPP participants 
would be afforded “all legal and procedural protection [s]” while residing in Mexico 
waiting for their MPP hearings.456 
However, other examples of press releases reflect a sense of urgency rather than 
antagonism. An April 2019 press release describing a visit to Calexico with members of 
Congress and President Trump described the “bold action being taken by DHS to address 
the dramatic influx of unaccompanied children and families.”457 Use of a defensive tone 
has also occurred during the MPP communications. In January 2020, DHS announced that 
Brazilians would now be processed under MPP, claiming that “the fact that Brazilians are 
now part of the program shows that the Department . . . [has] always sought to expand the 
program in a safe and responsible manner.”458 It is unclear though what this ambiguous 
and arguably defensive statement was intended to accomplish.  
b. Identification of Audiences and Publics 
As to the second factor of the language section of the model, none of the 
communications identified in Chapter IV stand out as particularly inappropriate for their 
primary intended audience. Press releases were generic enough to provide useful 
information to a primary audience and to serve as a background resource for secondary 
distribution to the public. 
Some MPP communications do reveal a possible attempt to appeal to a certain type 
of audience. For example, Secretary Nielsen’s 2018 early MPP announcement and the 
policy assessment released almost a year later contain numerous statistics about migrant 
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processing before and after MPP.459 These statistics were also used to support claims that 
fraud was occurring, such as the statement that “the number of asylum claims soared 67 
percent compared to the previous year [while m]ost of these claims are not meritorious.”460 
And, at an Arizona press conference, Secretary McAleenan made his case for the 
effectiveness of the MPP program using improvements in border crossing metrics, arguing 
that the program’s success should be measured in terms of a decrease in apprehensions of 
illegal aliens of certain nationalities.461  
c. Degree of Disclosure and Use of Ambiguity 
MPP-related communications employed several examples of the use of ambiguity 
and varying degrees of disclosure. Examples can be found in Secretary Nielsen’s 2018 
announcement about the program, such as the references to replacing “‘catch and release’ 
. . . with ‘catch and return.’” 462 Unlike communications from the parent-child separation 
policy, this statement was comparatively transparent and clear about DHS’s intentions in 
rolling out the MPP program.463 Regarding later allegations of humanitarian issues at 
border processing facilities, Secretary McAleenan acknowledged these operational 
challenges, in part due to Congress’s lack of responsiveness to requests for additional 
resources.464 In another document, DHS notes that a goal of MPP is “to reduce the 
incentive for aliens to assert claims for relief or protection.”465 This is a remarkably 
transparent statement about the administration’s intentions with the program, in contrast to 
the murky messaging found during the parent-child separation policy. 
Other communications displayed greater use of ambiguity, such as Secretary 
Nielsen’s claim that “vulnerable populations will get the protection they need while they 
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await a determination in Mexico” on protection claims filed with the Mexican 
government.466 However, the statement lacks detail about what steps, if any, the U.S. 
government would take to guarantee such protection.467 Likewise, on the issue of access 
to counsel, a January 2019 release includes two sentences about choosing counsel at the 
alien’s expense, but the release does not address the question of how U.S.-based 
immigration attorneys could meet with and effectively represent clients housed out of the 
country in Mexico.468 In its October 2019 MPP policy assessment, DHS noted “that MPP 
returnees in Mexico are provided access to humanitarian care and assistance, food and 
housing, work permits, and education,” although it does not identify the basis for such an 
understanding or outline any steps taken by DHS to ensure that these promises of the 
Mexican government were fulfilled.469 Likewise, the reference to many of Mexico’s “32 
states enjoying low unemployment and crime” might not even pass the smell test, since 
some of the highest levels of crime in Mexico occur in the states along the U.S. southern 
border to which MPP participants are returned following their hearings at border court 
facilities.470 The border state of Tamaulipas, for example, is classified by “the State 
Department . . . as the same level of danger as Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen.”471 
The use of ambiguity can also prompt action from stakeholders or shift debate on 
an issue from one discursive frame to another.472 Feront and Bertels, however, note that 
“the interplay between framing activities, meaning construction, and the interpretive 
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dynamics of various field constituents” is “largely unexamined” in the literature.473 For 
purposes of the present analysis, it is sufficient to point out communications examples from 
DHS where the speaker at least potentially intended to prompt field-level stakeholder 
action and to shift public discussion or awareness in a positive direction.  
For example, Secretary Nielsen claimed in April 2019 that “the crisis at our border 
is worsening,” as a reason to order the assignment of additional CBP personnel and to 
increase the numbers of aliens returned daily to Mexico pursuant to MPP.474 For 
apparently the first time during the MPP program, Nielsen directly blamed Congress for 
its “fail [ure] to act yet again,” and threatened that “all options are on the table.”475 It is 
unclear to what effect Nielsen intended this statement. In another April statement, in 
response to what she hyperbolically characterized as a “near system-wide meltdown,” 
Nielsen pivoted into “taking a full-fledged ‘disaster response’ approach to the border 
emergency,” borrowing terminology from outside the traditional immigration enforcement 
arena.476 This ambiguous reference to disaster response, a concept from the field of 
emergency management, can be interpreted as an attempt to re-frame the immigration 
debate and move the administration’s enforcement policies into the mainstream discourse. 
Intentional ambiguity can also take the form of straw-man arguments, such as 
Acting CBP Commissioner Morgan’s comments about Mexico’s “responsibility to provide 
security for migrants en route to their court hearings on the U.S. side.”477 He pointed out 
that the U.S. must avoid casting the entire nation of Mexico as a dangerous place, denying 
stories of harm occurring to MPP participants.478 Yet no one had suggested that the entire 
nation of Mexico is a war zone, only that the dangerous border states where MPP 
participants were most often housed were the most dangerous.479 Through this use of 
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ambiguity, Morgan deflected the conversation from a discussion of the merits of returning 
MPP participants to dangerous border states to one about whether the “entire nation [of 
Mexico] was a war zone.”480 
For a final example of ambiguous messaging, Secretary McAleenan claimed DHS 
had “provided protections to hundreds of asylum seekers,” and he praised MPP for “provid 
[ing] expeditious access and decisions for meritorious claims, and . . . discourag [ing] 
individuals with inadequate or false asylum claims” from gaining access to the United 
States.481 This grouping of inadequate and false claims to depict illegal immigration as a 
unitary evil that MPP seeks to prevent represents an ambiguity in messaging. His comment 
that one of MPP’s main accomplishments is “keeping families together . . . without keeping 
them in custody” served as a signal that MPP could be viewed as a more palatable version 
of the parent-child separation policy.482 Instead of prosecuting heads of household and 
separating families, the new policy kept them together but sent them back to Mexico as a 
family unit.483 
In sum, the language section of the model demonstrates both advantageous and 
disadvantageous use of tone and defensive language. Administration officials made 
significant use of ambiguity throughout the MPP rollout. Arguably, though, such usage 
preserves flexibility for future policy changes and can be used as a device to maintain 
consistency with prior messaging. 
D. LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS 
 Several limitations to this analysis are notable. First, it cannot be determined from 
an outsider perspective whether DHS significantly increased its outreach to or interaction 
with stakeholders, particularly with adversarial populations, during either policy rollout or 
the period between the two case studies. Such outreach and direct communication with 
private parties are likely not reported in the media and are not reported publicly by either 
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DHS or private parties. Thus, it is not possible for this thesis to assess whether DHS 
increased its outreach to adversarial stakeholders over time, or if so, at which stages of the 
communications process.484 Finally, to the extent that the communications output 
evaluation model contains any deficiencies or omissions, it is possible that this analysis 
likewise has similar limitations.  
 The following chapter concludes the thesis by reviewing the evaluation findings 
from this evaluation, drawing conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of DHS’s 
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VI. PUTTING IT INTO PRACTICE: 
WHAT AGENCIES CAN LEARN FROM THESE CASES 
The previous chapters inquire whether DHS’s public-facing communications are 
objectively measurable in a way that can inform policymaking during times of 
controversial policy rollout. Since “what gets measured is what gets done in organizations,” 
a focus on the measurement and evaluation (M&E) process is a natural starting point.485 
This is especially true since, for all the academic interest in M&E, it has not translated into 
widespread application in strategic communications practice.486 To bridge the gap 
between the theoretical and practical side of strategic communications, the model 
developed in Chapter II was used to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of DHS’s 
strategic communications efforts in the context of two immigration policy rollouts.  
This concluding chapter reviews the evaluation findings from Chapter V and draws 
conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of DHS’s communications strategy. The 
chapter then offers generalized policy recommendations for DHS and other large law 
enforcement agencies to maximize the effectiveness of their strategic communications 
efforts. 
A. BREAKING DOWN DHS’S COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY 
The M&E process analyzes communications output according to an objective 
model to identify the agency’s strengths and weaknesses in relevant areas. Rumelt’s 
conception of Good Strategy demands awareness of the few key strengths that can be used 
in an adverse situation to “multiply the effectiveness of effort” at key pivot points.487 
Based on the evaluation in Chapter V, some of DHS’s top strengths in strategic 
communications are determined to be: (1) creating strong, emotional messaging; (2) 
utilizing awareness of likely pending outrage (emotion) and litigation, developed from the 
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agency’s prior experiences; and (3) capitalizing on diplomatic successes and partnerships 
with regional nation partners. The next logical step in assessing an organization’s overall 
communications strategy inquires whether those strengths were appropriately applied 
when needed. 
In the parent-child separation case study discussed in Chapter III, top officials 
created emotional, strongly worded messages and delivered them with vigor. While the 
policy was short lived and ultimately rolled back, in part due to the mixed messaging and 
failure to engage stakeholders, the communications of Attorney General Jeff Sessions and 
Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen were nonetheless examples of strong rhetoric. In an appropriate 
situation, such messaging could be part of a powerful strategy to achieve favorable 
communications outcomes. For instance, after a significant focusing event such as a 
national emergency, serious natural disaster, or terrorist attack, strong messaging could be 
needed to swiftly gain public attention and support for the agency’s planned course of 
action.488 As events actually unfolded in 2018 during the zero tolerance policy rollout, 
however, it is unclear why these speakers felt such stern messaging and use of strong tone 
were needed at the time. No focusing event preceded the public rollout of the policy in 
April 2018. To the contrary, the administration kept its pilot program in El Paso secret in 
2017 and the public was mostly unaware of the pending policy changes. Thus, while the 
use of strong messaging was arguably one of the administration’s communications 
strengths, it was used at an inappropriate time during the zero tolerance policy. Under 
Rumelt’s conception of Good and Bad Strategy, a mismatch between the use of key 
strengths and appropriate pivot points in the external environment is not a successful 
application of Good Strategy. In an appropriate situation, use of such messaging could be 
part of a powerful strategy to achieve favorable communications outcomes. 
In the MPP case study discussed in Chapter IV, the opposite occurred. The 
messaging was more refined and less emotional, signaling an awareness that restraint was 
needed due to the possible negative public reaction about the rollout of the program and 
 
488 Focusing events are “sudden, attention-grabbing events” which are “potential triggers for policy 
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the potential of future litigation. The use of such restraint was well-timed during the policy 
rollout and allowed the program to expand to location after location and scale up operations 
until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
A third key strength was apparent in the communications regarding diplomatic 
successes and partnerships with regional nation partners, formed to implement MPP and 
related asylum reforms. The administration was able to capitalize on diplomatic successes 
with these nations.489 Essentially a form of diplomatic posturing, some of the more 
positive messaging from the MPP case study demonstrates the theme of outreach to and 
cooperation with foreign government stakeholders and partners. Use of this theme was a 
successful planned communications strategy because it made it difficult for critics of the 
program to argue that increased cooperation with foreign governments or providing foreign 
aid to regional partners was a negative. Further, officials employed this strength at the 
appropriate times, which helped DHS expand (or pivot, to use Rumelt’s terminology) from 
a one-site pilot to a border-wide program spanning seven sites and multiple states, all while 
minimizing the impact of public criticism. 
Thinking more broadly, imagine if these and other strengths are utilized at the 
appropriate pivot points during future communications challenges for DHS. In some 
situations, strong, even forceful, messaging will be needed to break through the media 
noise and reach a critical mass of listeners. According to the evaluation model developed 
in this thesis, even strong messaging must also include stakeholder engagement, awareness 
of potential emergent strategy, and a purposeful lack of information fratricide. But there is 
also an appropriate time to scale back the tone and vigor of messaging out of awareness 
that public outrage and litigation are on the horizon. And certainly, developing messaging 
centered on the United States’ diplomatic successes can be beneficial at pushing forward a 
successful communications strategy. 
These two case studies represent progression in DHS’s ability to successfully 
engage in strategic communications related to its immigration enforcement efforts. While 
the parent-child separation policy typifies a public relations disaster and is arguably a 
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communications strategy failure, by the time MPP was rolled out, it was apparent that the 
agency had learned the value of communicating with a more measured tone, consistent 
message, and straightforward approach.  
With these strategic lessons in mind, the following section explores future 
application of the evaluation model and policy recommendations for future 
communications challenges. 
B. A WAY FORWARD: FUTURE EVALUATION CAPABILITY AND 
POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
This section considers the present usage of the evaluation model developed in 
Chapter II and its potential future. It continues with a review of potential scenarios which 
implicate communications challenges and applies strategic lessons learned through this 
thesis research. 
1. A Matter of Perspective: Comparing a Post Hoc, Outsider Evaluation 
with a Future Practitioner-Oriented Evaluation 
A few words are in order to distinguish the outsider perspective adopted in this 
thesis from future analyses using a real-time, insider practitioner perspective. As discussed 
in Chapter II, the M&E literature contains multiple models which identify factors related 
to all phases of the communications planning, execution, and evaluation processes. 
Likewise, some of the factors of the model developed in this thesis align more closely with 
certain phases of the communications process than others. The factors which lend 
themselves to a post hoc style of evaluation of communications output were discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter V than factors more suited to the planning or pre-messaging 
phases of the strategic communications process. These factors include use of planned and 
emergent strategy, timing and consistency of messaging, use of tone, degree of disclosure, 
and use of ambiguous language. Discussion of these factors on a post hoc basis is possible 
because such usage and characteristics are apparent from the communications themselves. 
Conversely, other factors presented in the model are better suited for internal 
planning use prior to final communications output and are less appropriate for a post hoc 
analysis of an organization’s communications about a historical issue. For example, 
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without interviews and review of internal communications and documents, it is not possible 
to form definitive conclusions about speakers’ intent and consideration of information end 
states, intent behind the use of ambiguity in messaging, or private engagement with and 
listening to stakeholders prior to messaging. Where multiple explanations or conclusions 
are possible, such uncertainty was noted in the analysis in the preceding chapters. Such 
aspects of the evaluation model are more useful for the earlier planning stages of 
communications and thus were outside the scope of the evaluation in this thesis. 
Nonetheless, all factors in the model are important for strategic, tactical, and operational 
planning for future communications campaigns. It is recommended that communications 
professionals consider these forward-looking aspects of strategic communications in future 
planning and development of messaging. 
Future communications planning should also include the incremental feedback and 
adjustments provided through what Jim Macnamara calls insights or outtakes. As 
demonstrated in Chapters I and II, a strict, linear approach to strategic communications 
culminating in evaluation by practitioners separate and apart from the actual decision-
makers is erroneous and lacks rigor and utility. Instead, the functions of managers and 
communications practitioners should be more integrated from the beginning. Macnamara’s 
conception of insights or outtakes, or mid-cycle feedback, can provide helpful “inferences, 
predictions, suggestions and recommendations” prior to final evaluation.490 For purposes 
of the evaluation performed in this thesis, there was a degree of analytical overlap between 
such insights-style feedback and the analysis of emergent and participatory strategy. This 
is because the impact of communications on stakeholders at a given point in time 
necessarily has a corresponding subsequent impact on the agency’s future communications 
development. Whether this subsequent impact is called “insights” or is described as a part 
of emergent or participatory strategy is mostly dependent on the agency’s awareness and 
encouragement of the process. An unwanted or unbeknown impact might form an emergent 
strategy, while the active incorporation of feedback into future communications would be 
a use of insights. 
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Adopting an outsider perspective required the evaluation in this thesis to focus on 
emergent and participatory strategy due to the lack of internal information about feedback 
processes during the policy rollouts. Use of the evaluation model in future communications 
campaigns is likely to include a more substantial use of insights, however. Such feedback 
can be internal, such as pre-decisional internal conversations during a policy rollout, or 
debriefings following a press conference or other major public policy event.491  
2. Recommendations for Future Communications Challenges 
This section examines generalized findings from this research for future 
communications policy within DHS. An appropriate method for discussing such potential 
future policy action is through the use of if-then statements. Public policy literature is 
replete with examples of an if-then mode of analysis as a “basic structure of a theory of 
change.”492 Such analysis generally includes isolating an issue for scrutiny, investigating 
inputs from an organization, and predicting output activities with an accompanying 
explanation of the rationale.493 Based on the research of this thesis, several such if-then 
inquiries are feasible and are discussed below.  
If DHS wants to roll out a potentially unpopular immigration policy in the 
future, then prudent actions in the area of strategic communications to ensure the 
success of communications objectives include:  
• identifying communications strengths in advance;  
• devoting significant resources toward these strengths; 
• considering information end-states; and 
• identifying appropriate policy justifications before messaging. 
This scenario occurred during both case studies discussed in this thesis. It would be 
prudent for an organization considering how to conduct messaging on an unpopular policy 
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to study its top two or three communications strengths in advance of policy rollout and 
messaging development and to devote significant resources to using those strengths to 
achieve objectives. Further, the objectives can be defined in advance in terms of 
information end-states. The organization should have a clear vision of the operational need 
and justification for a policy to facilitate unconflicted communications about the policy 
during the rollout. Just as it is difficult to repair an airplane in mid-flight, it is difficult to 
tweak messaging about the justification for a policy after the policy has already been 
implemented and has drawn criticism. Attempting to justify a policy on an ad hoc basis can 
result in the semantic disputes and mixed messaging seen during the parent-child 
separation policy. 
If DHS wants to replace an already unpopular policy with a more palatable 
version, then appropriate communications methods include:  
• timely acknowledging and taking ownership of prior problems; 
• varying the use of clarity or ambiguity in messaging to the agency’s 
advantage; and 
• reframing issues to distance a new policy from a problematic one. 
If a policy appears unsalvageable during a rollout and it is necessary to pivot to 
something more tolerable to the public and stakeholders, several steps may ensure a better 
reception of the revised or reimagined policy. First, it is likely necessary to acknowledge 
and take ownership of prior problems, preferably before such action is forced by court 
order or another external driver of compulsory change. During the parent-child separation 
policy, the administration pivoted in June 2018 with the issuance of an executive order to 
stop separations, although the order was preceded by unhelpful ambiguous statements 
about whether the president had the legal authority to stop the separations. 
The use of ambiguity, however, may be helpful in the rollout of a revised version 
of a previously unpopular policy, depending on the level of similarity or difference between 
the original and revised policies. It may work to the agency’s advantage to use messaging 
that approaches the new policy as something altogether new, rather than a revision of a 
problematic existing policy, and which minimizes public perception that the revised policy 
is just more of the same. Arguably, this occurred with the rollout of MPP, as the agency 
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did not attempt to portray MPP as a reimagined zero tolerance policy, despite the similarity 
in the objectives of the two policies. 
If a future administration or DHS leadership appoints so-called hardliner or 
politically charged figures to highly visible positions, then the role of such officials in 
the development or coordination of messaging can include:  
• coordinating among agency leadership who takes the lead on public 
communications; 
• ensuring that public statements of lower-level, non-leadership 
officials are completely consistent with leadership-approved 
messaging; 
• designating a lead agency or department for messaging decisions 
during multi-agency policy rollouts; and 
• using inter-agency clearance processes to vet release of 
controversial policy details or arguments. 
Future appointment of individuals who push for “extremely aggressive efforts” to 
address policy problems may present conflicts when such individuals make public 
comments which vary significantly in tone or message from those made by other 
administration officials, particularly from non-political career officials.494 As Cohen notes, 
“multiple layers of political appointees only increase the likelihood of mixed or 
contradictory messages and slow down the communication, and complicate the 
enforcement, of Administration policies.”495 Having multiple uncoordinated speakers 
opining on a policy, at a minimum, creates inefficiency and conflict and can lead to 
information fratricide. If subordinate employees are authorized to speak at all publicly 
about a controversial policy, care should be taken that such lower-level statements are 
completely consistent with leadership-approved messaging.496  
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Such conflict is magnified when multiple Cabinet departments share responsibility 
for various operational aspects of a policy and each department has its own 
communications staff. Given this overlap and potential for mixed messaging, it would be 
prudent for one agency or department to take the lead on messaging decisions during a 
policy rollout and for officials to actively coordinate to avoid information fratricide. 
Adequate inter-agency clearance processes should be in place and utilized to vet the release 
of controversial policy details and arguments, as an agency cannot assume that its 
counterparts within DHS or in other Cabinet departments are issuing consistent messaging 
on the same issues. While it is true that agencies may have diverging equities and may view 
their piece of the communications pie as distinct from that of other agencies, this is unlikely 
to hold true for public and stakeholder perceptions of a policy.497 The consequence is that 
a speaker from one agency is unlikely to be able to deflect negative attention to another 
agency if problem issues arise. 
If DHS conducts future pilots of controversial policies in an undisclosed 
manner, then prudent safeguards to minimize fallout if such policies are later made 
public include:  
• justifying non-disclosure with appropriate reasoning to withstand 
public or judicial scrutiny; 
• expecting and preparing for eventual full disclosure; 
• incorporating disclosure planning into information end-states; 
• preparing for accusations that the agency has intentionally released 
inaccurate, conflicting, incomplete, or otherwise unsavory 
information.  
As Chapter V discussed, there are at times valid reasons for conducting pilot 
programs in secret. Such reasons can include giving a program a head start to develop data 
supporting the efficacy of a program; maintaining secrecy of operational details due to 
sensitivity or an investigative need; or preserving the agency’s position in anticipation of 
litigation and the possibility of restraining orders or injunctions. 
 
497 In the parent-child separation policy, for example, DHS (ICE and CBP), DOJ (DOJ headquarters 
and various U.S. Attorney’s Offices), and HHS (ORR) each held distinct but overlapping equities in the 
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less important. 
122 
However, the public, media, and stakeholders will likely demand full disclosure if 
such programs come to light and may question the late timing of the disclosure. As a 
component of planning for information end-states, agencies should expect and be prepared 
to head off unwarranted accusations of Dark Side messaging by adversarial stakeholders. 
As noted earlier, Dark Side messaging generally refers to the intentional release of 
inaccurate, conflicting, incomplete, or otherwise unsavory information as a matter of 
strategy.498 Clearer communications may mitigate this possibility and such clarity is a 
worthwhile goal of messaging development. Certainly, significant coordination of 
messaging between agencies sharing responsibility for a policy rollout will likewise be 
prudent in cases of undisclosed policies. 
C. UNRESOLVED ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCHERS 
The myriad of issues raised in the two case studies are complex and warrant future 
research into various topics outside the scope of this thesis. This research specifically 
avoided analyzing the merits of either policy, although such issues are ripe for study. 
Further, using an outsider perspective for this research only allows study of the model 
factors which correspond to the observable characteristics of communications effects on 
the public. Internal issues and processes within DHS were assumed to be unknown during 
this research, and thus the aspects of model factors pertaining to internal issues such as 
motivation and intent were not addressed. A more comprehensive application of a strategic 
communications model to analyze the entirety of DHS’s communications process would 
also entail examination of internal documents, interviews with employees, and other more 
invasive and resource-intensive research methods. 
The impact of the Twitter effect is another important issue not accounted for in any 
extant strategic communications models and should be researched in the future. In other 
words, the phenomenon where agency leaders speak directly about official matters on 
social media accounts such as Twitter raises the question whether they are speaking in their 
personal or official capacities.499 Such statements will likely be used against the agency in 
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the media, public opinion, or litigation, yet they may technically be personal statements. In 
extreme cases involving Tweets ostensibly phrased as orders or commands, the larger 
question arises whether such statements have binding legal effect.500 Future research and 
work on M&E models should include the effects of such quasi-personal communications. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis began by asking about the role of strategic communications in enacting 
immigration policy during the Trump administration. In developing an evaluation model, 
working through several case studies, and synthesizing the findings, this thesis targets a 
gap in understanding appropriate methods to evaluate the communications output of a large 
law enforcement agency. When controversial policies are involved, the communications 
supporting a policy rollout will never be perfect. However, with careful, thoughtful 
planning and appropriate evaluation along the way, an agency can discover and make 
appropriate use of effective strategy in its communications. 
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